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ABSTRACT 
 
The consensus around shareholder primacy is crumbling. Investors, long 
assumed to be uncomplicated profit-maximizers, are looking for ways to express 
a wider range of values in allocating their funds. Workers are agitating for 
greater voice at their workplaces. And prominent legislators have recently 
proposed corporate law reforms that would put a sizable number of employee 
representatives on the boards of directors of large public companies. These 
rumblings of public discontent are echoed in recent corporate law scholarship, 
which has cataloged the costs of shareholder control, touted the advantages of 
nonvoting stock, and questioned whether activist holders of various stripes are 
acting in the company’s best interests. Academics who support stronger 
shareholder rights are accused of pandering to special interest groups or 
naively seeking a panacea in a plebiscite.  
 
As critical theorists have documented over time, the foundations of the 
shareholder primacy model have always been compromised. In particular, the 
arguments for a core feature of the modern corporation—the exclusive 
shareholder franchise—have been revealed as the product of flawed 
assumptions, misapplied social choice theory, and a failure to hold true to the 
fundamental precepts of standard economics. It is time to look at such 
governance features anew, and reorient the literature around the basic purpose 
of corporations: to provide a legal mechanism for business firms to engage in 
the process of joint production. In this article, we demonstrate how the 
prerogatives of corporate governance have been improperly limited to 
shareholders. We then present a new mutual-control model of corporate 
governance, one that builds on the longstanding theory of the firm as well as a 
novel theory of democratic participation. These twin arguments, economic and 
political, both counsel in favor of extending the corporate franchise to 
employees as well as shareholders, and, importantly, provide a way to 
distinguish these two constituencies from other corporate stakeholders when it 
comes to governance rights. We conclude by assessing the current status of a 
shared governance system in Germany and advocating for further theoretical 
and empirical inquiry into organizational governance structures that provide 
for joint shareholder and employee participation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a remarkable moment in corporate law. Everything is about to change. 
The status quo of shareholder primacy clings stubbornly on, full of its old power 
in appearance, and yet it is a façade. It is the Soviet Union after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. It is Persia after Thermopylae, the British Raj after the Salt March, 
disco after the Ramones. We are at the beginning of the end. 
This claim may seem absurd in light of the dominance of shareholder 
primacy theory throughout the United States, the European Union, and 
developing nations. The academic network behind shareholder primacy remains 
resolute; almost all corporate law scholarship pivots around the central idea of 
shareholder control.1 It is almost twenty years since Henry Hansmann and 
Reinier Kraakman’s declaration about the end of corporate law history,2 and 
shareholder wealth maximization remains the governing norm.  
But underneath the superficial agreement is a roiling mass of disputes and 
divisions. The field is more fractured than ever before. The prospect of real 
shareholder empowerment, through proxy access or shareholder bylaws, has 
split the academy into subgroups that advocate for divergent approaches.3 
Activist investors have gone from the saviors of shareholder rights4 to short-term 
                                                          
1 Ann M. Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, 44 J. CORP. L. 297, 300 (2019) (“Most 
modern theories of the corporation subscribe to what is known as ‘shareholder 
primacy,’ i.e., the notion that directors have, or should have, a commitment to manage 
the corporation in a manner that benefits the shareholders.”). 
2 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view 
that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”). 
3 See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 1, at 300 (discussing “sharply divergent views of the 
precise nature of directors' legal obligations”). The Bainbridge-Bebchuk debate over 
the role of shareholder participation in management is one example. Compare Lucian 
A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 835 
(2005) (arguing that shareholders should have increased governance power), with 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003) (advocating for a director primacy 
model). 
4 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge 
Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1089 (2015) (noting research in finance that 
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opportunists who should be marginalized.5 Money is being shoveled like never 
before into passive index funds and exchange-traded funds—the absentee 
landlords of stock ownership.6 Important recent scholarship focuses on the 
problems of “principal costs” generated by investor governance7 and touts the 
advantages of nonvoting shares.8 Leaders in the field such as Nobel Laureate 
Oliver Hart,9 Michael Jensen,10 and Delaware Chief Justice Leo Strine11 are 
                                                          
“public disclosures of the purchase of a significant stake by an activist are accompanied 
by significant positive stock-price reactions as well as followed by subsequent 
improvements in operating performance”); Mark Hulbert, A Good Word for Hedge 
Fund Activism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2007, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/business/yourmoney/18stra.html. 
5 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood 
Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 
126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1874 (2017) (discussing the dangers of hedge-fund activism); 
James B. Stewart, Hedge Funds Should Be Thriving Right Now. They Aren’t., N.Y. 
TIMES, July 12, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/business/hedge-
funds.html. 
6 See, e.g., Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. 
L. 493, 102 (2018) (noting that millions of investors have moved their money from 
actively managed mutual funds to passively managed funds); Bryan Borzykowski, The 
trillion-dollar ETF boom triggered by the financial crisis just keeps getting bigger, 
CNBC.COM, Sept. 14, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/14/the-trillion-dollar-etf-
boom-triggered-by-the-financial-crisis.html (“In 2008, U.S. investors had $531 billion 
in ETFs; that's jumped to more than $3.4 trillion today, according to Statistica.”). 
7 Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law 
and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 770 (2017). 
8 Dorothy S. Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, 71 STAN. 
L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3028173. 
9 Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not 
Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN & ACCT. 247, 248 (2017). 
10 Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate 
Objective Function, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 2010, at 32, 33 (arguing that 
corporations should pursue “maximization of the long-run value of the firm” rather than 
shareholder wealth maximization). 
11 Hon. Leo E. Strine, Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of Institutional Investors to 
Prevent the Illegitimate Use of Working Americans’ Savings for Corporate Political 
Spending, Working Paper, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3304611 (arguing that “Worker 
Investors” have different interests than purely financial investors and that fund 
managers have a fiduciary duty to represent these hybrid interests when exercising the 
voting power of the shares). See Ann Lipton, Strine and Wealth Maximization: Cracks 
in the Wall?, BUS. LAW PROF. BLOG, Dec. 29, 2018, 
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questioning the stability of shareholder primacy as a regulatory norm. The 
corporate-law centre cannot hold. 
Now that shareholder primacy is losing its grip on the corporate world, for 
the first time in a very long time we can start to see the outlines of what will 
come after. The next wave in corporate governance is coming, and it will include 
workers. For too long, labor has been left outside of the corporate governance 
gates. But we now see concrete examples of the coming change. Recent bills 
proposed by Senators Tammy Baldwin and Elizabeth Warren provide workers 
with representation on the board of directors.12 The Walkout for Change by 
Google workers demanded, in part, the appointment of an employee 
representative to Google’s board.13 The German system of codetermination, 
where workers elect up to half the members of the corporate supervisory board, 
showed its strength and resilience in the recovery from the global economic 
crisis.14 And new managerial methodologies providing for participatory 
management and employee voice are increasingly popular around the globe.15 
Policymakers, workers’ advocates, and workers themselves are looking anew at 
the corporate structure and asking why workers have been left out. 
 Despite these murmurings of change, corporations have more legal and 
economic power than ever before. Over the last decade, corporate profits have 
hovered between nine and eleven percent of the U.S. gross domestic product—
the highest sustained average percentage on record.16 Recent tax changes have 
                                                          
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2018/12/strine-and-wealth-
maximization.html (arguing that Strine “is placing workers’ shared desire for certain 
basic living standards on par with the hypothetical shared desire of all investors to 
maximize returns, and claiming that mutual funds have a duty to advance those 
interests”). 
12 Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018); Reward Work Act, S. 
2605, 115th Cong. (2018). 
13 Noam Scheiber, Google Workers Reject Silicon Valley Individualism in Walkout, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/business/google-
employee-walkout-labor.html. 
14 [Add cite] 
15 See, e.g., FREDERIC LALOUX, REINVENTING ORGANIZATIONS: A GUIDE TO 
CREATING ORGANIZATIONS INSPIRED BY THE NEXT STAGE OF HUMAN 
CONSCIOUSNESS (2014); BRIAN J. ROBERTSON, HOLACRACY: THE NEW 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD (2015). 
16 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Research, Corporate Profits After Tax 
(without IVA and CCAdj)/Gross Domestic Product, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=1Pik; see also Tim Worstall, Why Have Corporate 
Profits Been Rising as a Percentage Of GDP? Globalisation, FORBES, May 7, 2013, 
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dramatically slashed corporate tax bills and returned billions of dollars to 
corporate coffers.17 And the power of the corporate form continues to expand. 
By providing corporations with individualized constitutional and statutory rights 
of expression, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Citizens United18and Hobby 
Lobby19 have extended the corporation’s powers even more deeply into politics, 
religion, and culture. 
Within the corporation, the shareholder franchise has long been the critical 
control feature. No other group of corporate constituents—employees, 
bondholders, customers, or suppliers—possesses anything close to this level of 
control over firm decisions. The justifications for this exclusivity are well worn 
at this point, even if they remain somewhat slippery. One model describes the 
corporation as a nexus of freely bargained contracts, and therefore 
presumptively the most efficient way to structure firm governance.20 Another 
justification is that shareholders are owners of the corporate residual, and they 
have the appropriate incentives to make good firm decisions.21 Rights to the 
residual provide shareholders with a common interest in maximizing corporate 
                                                          
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/05/07/why-have-corporate-profits-
been-rising-as-a-percentage-of-gdp-globalisation/#6a27a3fb2a6e. At the same time, 
workers’ wages and salaries have reached their lowest percentage of GDP. Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Research, Compensation of Employees: Wages 
and Salary Accruals/Gross Domestic Product, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=2Xa; 
Michael Madowitz & Seth Hanlon, GDP Is Growing, but Workers’ Wages Aren’t, 
CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, July 26, 2018, 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2018/07/26/454087/gdp-
growing-workers-wages-arent/. 
17 An Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent 
Resolution on the Budget for the Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C) (known as the “Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act of 2017”) (cutting the corporate tax rate from 35% to 20%). 
18 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
19 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
20 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors As Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA 
L. REV. 1, 9 (2002) (“The dominant model of the corporation in legal scholarship is the 
so-called nexus of contracts theory.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989) (“The corporation is a 
complex set of explicit and implicit contracts, and corporate law enables the participants 
to select the optimal arrangement for the many different sets of risks and opportunities 
that are available in a large economy.”). 
21 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 67-68 (1991) (justifying the corporate franchise based on 
shareholders’ interests in the residual) 
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profits, which reduces their tendency to squabble about firm decisions and 
allegedly eliminates the possibility of having voting cycles infect board 
elections.22 Scholars who believe in shareholder wealth maximization but 
nevertheless believe in centralized board authority have tinkered around the 
edges of these standard economic accounts by emphasizing the important of 
board or managerial discretion.23  
But these traditional arguments for the shareholder franchise are falling 
apart—not just from criticisms by outsiders, but through conflicts from inside 
the house. It is well-recognized now that shareholders across the board have 
heterogeneous, rather than homogenous, interests that diverge along a number 
of dimensions.24 Scholars are losing trust in shareholders with significant 
power,25 and there is even support for nonvoting shares and passive 
shareholding.26 Those academics who support strengthened shareholder power 
are accused of supporting special interests and shadow agendas.27 The house of 
the exclusive shareholder franchise is collapsing in on itself. 
                                                          
22 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 395, 405 (1983) (discussing KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND 
INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963)). 
23 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 3. 
24 See Goshen & Squire, supra note 7, at 791 (describing “several sources of conflict 
among shareholders, including differing investment horizons and needs for cash 
payouts, empty voting, and competing outside interests”); Grant M. Hayden & Matthew 
T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 505 (2008) (“It is becoming increasingly clear, for example, 
that shareholders have many different types of interests in a corporation.”). 
25 Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2008) (“[A]ctivist shareholders are using their growing influence 
not to improve overall firm performance, as has generally been assumed, but to profit 
at other shareholders' expense.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and 
Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1750 (2006) (“[S]hareholder 
voting is properly understood not as a primary component of the corporate 
decisionmaking structure, but rather as an accountability device of last resort, to be used 
sparingly, at most.”). 
26 Lund, supra note 8; Lund, supra note 6. 
27 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 1754 (claiming that Lucian Bebchuk's 
argument for shareholder empowerment would help “precisely the institutions most 
likely to use their position to self-deal--that is, to take a non-pro rata share of the firm's 
assets and earnings--or otherwise to reap private benefits not shared with other 
investors”); Hon. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A 
Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 449, 451 (2014) (“Bebchuk is the sincere champion of one group of 
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With the standard economic approaches on the ropes, we’d expect to see 
alternatives rise to fill the gaps in corporate governance theory. But there is a 
dearth of such alternatives. Most progressive scholars have to this point have left 
the shareholder franchise alone and cross their fingers for more ecumenical firm 
decisionmaking.28 Stakeholder advocates have not put forth convincing 
theoretical distinctions among constituencies that might tell us which group 
preferences are best captured by governance and which by contract.29 The 
growth of B-Corps and benefit corporations has created a parallel corporate 
ecosystem outside of the traditional one where shareholder primacy can been 
watered down or diminished—but not replaced.30 Even those who dare to dream 
big have—up to now—checked their expectations at the door.31 Forces are 
amassing but still scattered and diffuse. 
The reconstruction of corporate governance theory, at minimum, needs to 
include a reassessment of which stakeholders should have their preferences 
captured through the most powerful feature of corporate control—voting—and 
which should have their preferences captured through contract. To answer this 
question, we need to return to the economic theory of the firm. We must 
                                                          
‘agents’ wielding power and authority over others' money—the money managers who 
control most of the investments belonging ultimately to ordinary Americans who are 
saving to pay for their retirements and for their children's education—against another 
group of ‘agents’ that he believes is somehow more conflicted--the agents who actually 
manage corporations that make real products and deliver useful services (i.e. 
‘productive corporations’”). 
28 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 290-91 (1999) (describing directors as trustees for 
stakeholders). 
29 Kent Greenfield has come the closest to proposing a redesigned board of directors, 
but he did not lay out specifics. See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 112 
(2006) (“The specifics will be difficult but not impossible: employees could elect a 
proportion of the board; communities in which the company employs a significant 
percentage of the workforce could be asked to propose a representative to the board; 
long-term business partners and creditors could be represented as well.”). 
30 Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681, 
682 (2013) (“Enthusiasts argue social enterprises will have a more positive and 
sustainable impact on people and planet than ordinary for-profit businesses.”); Heerad 
Sabeti, The For-Benefit Enterprise, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2011, at 98. 
31 Brett H. McDonnell, Strategies for an Employee Role in Corporate Governance, 46 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429, 442 (2011) (stating that “large legal changes that would 
strongly encourage or mandate significant employee involvement [in corporate 
governance] are politically quite unlikely to succeed”). 
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reconsider the purpose of corporations and the legal and economic purposes they 
serve. Corporate governance is about running a firm and aggregating the 
preferences of members. Corporations need to include the participants that are 
directly engaged in the business enterprise: employees. Such an addition to the 
corporate electorate is both consistent with the longstanding theory of the firm 
and counseled by voting rights theory. Together, both economic and democratic 
theories support a model for corporate theory that incorporates employees 
expressly into the inner sanctum of corporate governance.  
This article catalogs the main shortcomings of existent corporate 
governance theory and proposes a mutual-control model of the firm to replace 
it. We begin, in Part II, by recounting the intellectual foundations of the 
shareholder primacy norm that dominates current corporate law scholarship. In 
doing so, we will focus on the core feature of that norm—the exclusive 
shareholder franchise—and the arguments put forth in support of it. These 
arguments have a range of problems: they are based on a number of faulty 
empirical assumptions; they misapply basic economic and social choice theory; 
and, in the end, they often rely on a bit wishful thinking on the part of legal 
scholars determined to paper over the cracks in their theories. This has left the 
scholarly case for shareholder voting—most of which comes out of the law-and-
economics tradition—on the verge of collapse.  
In the central sections of the article, we develop a mutual-control theory of 
corporate governance. In Part III, we begin to reconstruct corporate governance 
scholarship by returning to and reinvigorating the longstanding theory of the 
firm. This theory, born out of a desire to explain why business firms exist apart 
from markets in the first place, is not only consistent with but actually militates 
in favor of greater employee participation in corporate governance. As 
participants in joint production, those employees should also have voting rights 
within the firm. In Part IV, we develop a new theory of democratic participation 
that helps explain which corporate constituents should be extended the corporate 
franchise rights (and. just as importantly, which should not). This theory, fully 
consistent with mainstream democratic theory and informed by voting rights 
jurisprudence, also counsels in favor of extending voting rights to employees in 
ordinary corporate governance situations. We will also examine the example of 
German codetermination as an empirical proof of concept. In the end, the 
economic theory of the firm and the democratic theory of participation provide 
the foundation for a new vision of corporate governance, one that includes 
workers and shareholders, labor and equity, for the benefit of all corporate 
stakeholders. 
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II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
 Shareholder primacy, a version of corporate governance that assigns 
priority to shareholder interests above all others, has been the consensus 
governance model in corporate law for at least thirty years.32 The exclusive 
shareholder election of the board of directors has been around even longer, 
dating back to the proliferation of corporations in the nineteenth century.33 But 
while corporate law currently embodies both of these governing principles, they 
are not necessary components of the corporate form. In fact, shareholder 
primacy theory has been riddled with inconsistencies and spackled-over cracks 
from its inception.  
 
A. The Structure of Corporate Governance 
The corporation is the dominant organizational form for businesses in the 
United States. Although a variety of legal options exist—such as the partnership, 
the limited liability company (LLC), and the sole proprietorship—the 
corporation dominates the economic landscape.34 For that reason, the 
                                                          
32 Cede & Co v. Technicolor, Inc, 634 A2d 345, 360 (Del 1993) (“(D)irectors are 
charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the corporation and 
to act in the best interests of its shareholders.”). See also E. Norman Veasey, Should 
Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good Corporate Governance Practices--or 
Vice Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. Rev. 2179, 2184 (2001) (stating that Delaware law adopts 
the norm of shareholder primacy). 
33 See Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from the 
History of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1351-53 (2006) 
(noting that shareholders have had voting power extending back to the earliest of 
corporations). However, many early corporations did not follow the one-share, one-vote 
rule. See id. at 1358 (finding that the “thrust of early nineteenth-century American 
practice--and, implicitly, the dominant social conceptions of the corporation-- limited 
the voting power of large shareholders in some manner”); see also Henry Hansmann & 
Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation of 
Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 948, 953–54 (2014) (acknowledging such 
voting structures but arguing that “voting restrictions generally served as a consumer 
protection device in corporations that were, in a rough sense, consumer cooperatives”). 
34 Andrew Lundeen & Kyle Pomerleau, Corporations Make up 5 Percent of Businesses 
but Earn 62 Percent of Revenues, TAX FOUNDATION (Nov. 25, 2014), 
http://taxfoundation.org/blog/corporations-make-5-percent-businesses-earn-62-
percent-revenues (noting that only five percent of the organizational entities in the 
United States are corporations, but sixty-two percent of organizational tax revenues 
come from corporations). 
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corporation (or company) has been described as “[t]he most important 
organization in the world . . . : the basis of the prosperity of the West and the 
best hope for the future of the rest of the world.”35 When we think of businesses, 
we think of corporations. 
Under our federalized system, corporations are creatures of state corporate 
law. To form a corporation, the incorporating individuals must file a corporate 
charter, also known as the articles or certificate of incorporation.36 The articles 
of incorporation provide basic information including the corporation’s name, the 
incorporators, the corporation’s business, and the total number of shares the 
corporation may issue.37 An incorporation fee is also required.  
Once a corporation is established, control shifts from the entity’s 
incorporators to its board of directors.38 The board controls the firm and has the 
ability to legally bind the corporation to its decisions.39 Shareholders elect the 
directors at the annual shareholders meeting by in-person voting or the use of 
proxies.40 Directors must act in the corporation’s interests and are bound by 
certain fiduciary duties, primarily good faith, care, and loyalty.41 However, 
directors generally delegate the actual job of running the business to the officers, 
primarily through a hierarchy of employees headed by the chief executive officer 
(CEO).42 This structure—shareholders select the directors, who in turn select the 
officers to run the corporation—replicates itself in corporations from every state. 
                                                          
35 John Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge, The Company: A Short History of a 
Revolutionary Idea xv (2005). See also LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE 
UNCORPORATION 4 (2010) (“The corporation undeniably has driven business growth 
in the United States since the Industrial Revolution.”). 
36 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(a) (2015). 
37 Id. § 102. Other permissible governance structure provisions include limitations on 
director liability, id. § 102(b)(7), and staggering the terms of the board of directors, id. 
§ 141(d). 
38 Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 86 (Claire Hill & Brett 
McDonnell eds., 2012). 
39 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(1)–(2). 
40 Id. § 211(b). 
41 Bodie, supra note 38, at 86. 
42 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (“Every corporation organized under this 
chapter shall have such officers with such titles and duties as shall be stated in the 
bylaws or in a resolution of the board of directors which is not inconsistent with the 
bylaws . . . .”). 
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Even though state corporate law allows for a great deal of organizational 
flexibility, actual governance structures are remarkably uniform. Delaware 
corporate law, for example, does not even require a corporation to have a 
board,43 and yet all corporations have them. While there are some variations in 
governance structures, both among actual corporations and in the guise of 
potential reforms, the corporate form has remained relatively stable over the last 
century. And the critical feature of corporate governance control—who gets to 
vote, about what, and under what circumstances—has also been fixed: the 
corporate franchise belongs to shareholders and shareholders alone. 
 
B.  The Intellectual Foundations of the Shareholder Franchise 
Shareholders have held the right to vote within the corporation since its 
inception.44 The classic justification for the shareholder franchise is that 
shareholders are the “owners” of the corporation and therefore should have the 
right to control it.45 The law and economics justification has centered around the 
shareholder’s right to the “residual”—namely, the residual profits remaining 
after all other claimants have been paid.46 Because they are paid “last,” the 
argument goes, they have the best set of incentives for governing the company.47 
Over time, the role of shareholders within the public corporation evolved from 
absentee landlords into the center of inspiration. The theory of shareholder 
primacy redesigned the purpose and function of the corporation to center around 
shareholder wealth maximization.48 Although shareholder primacy has its roots 
in the early case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,49 it did not achieve full flower 
                                                          
43 Id. § 141. 
44 Dunlavy, supra note 33, at 1351-53. 
45 Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1189, 1190-92 (2002). 
46 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 67 (“The reason [that shareholders vote] 
is that the shareholders are the residual claimants to the firm’s income.”). 
47 See MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 21 (1995) (“Because shareholders 
are in this residual claim position, most economists argue that they have the greatest 
incentive to see that the company makes good business decisions and uses its assets 
wisely to earn profits.”). 
48 Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy, 
31 J. CORP. L. 975, 977 (2006) (“This [shareholder primacy] norm is much more than 
a descriptive account of shareholders' rights; it is instead a normative judgment on the 
most socially efficient way of organizing the economy.”). 
49 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
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until the law and economics movement in corporate law, combined with the 
advantageous tax treatment of stock options.50 By the mid-2000s, if not before, 
the shareholder primacy norm oriented both academic theory and boardroom 
practice. 
Along with the shareholder primacy norm, the “nexus of contracts” theory 
of the corporation is also popular in economics and legal academic circles.51 The 
theory rejects the notion that the corporation is a separate entity by describing it 
instead as a set of voluntary contractual relationships with the corporation at the 
center. Under this theory, the corporation does not really exist and instead should 
best be considered as cluster of commercial agreements among a variety of 
parties. The nexus of contracts approach counsels for a “hands-off” or default-
rule approach to corporate law, as the corporation is conceived as a set of 
voluntarily-chosen relationships between different parties.52 
Although these pillars of modern corporate law theory are both associated 
with the law and economics movement, they have always had, at best, an uneasy 
relationship.53 Shareholder primacy focuses on the importance of shareholders 
                                                          
50 Shareholder primacy proponents touted the importance of stock-oriented 
performance incentives for management to provide the proper incentives. See, e.g., 
Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, 
But How, 68 HARV. BUS. REV. 138 (1990). In 1993, the tax code was amended to 
prohibit the deduction of executive compensation over $1,000,000 unless it was 
performance-based. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2012). See Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling 
Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 879 
(2007) (“The purpose of this legislation was to enhance shareholder wealth in two ways: 
by reducing the overall level of executive compensation and by influencing the 
composition of executive compensation arrangements in favor of components that were 
more sensitive to firm performance.”). The end result was a dramatic increase in the use 
of stock options in executive compensation. Id. at 906 (“It is widely believed that § 
162(m) contributed significantly to the explosion of compensatory stock options that 
began in the late 1990s.”). 
51 See generally Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Voting and the 
Symbolic Politics of Corporation as Contract, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511 (2018).  
52 Cf. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 
84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 544 (1990) (developing the “triviality hypothesis”—namely, 
that “appearances notwithstanding, state corporate law is trivial: it does not prevent 
companies—managers and investors together—from establishing any set of governance 
rules they want”). 
53 See GREENFIELD, supra note 29 (proposing that a board of directors selected by a 
variety of stakeholders would be “a genuine realization of the ‘nexus of contracts’ view 
of the firm”). 
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to the corporation and often trades on the notion that shareholders “own” this 
entity, the corporation, outright. The nexus of contracts theory, on the other 
hand, abandons the concept of a separate corporate structure and places all of its 
participants, including shareholders, on an equal contractual footing. At a 
minimum, the two theories seem to pull in opposite directions when it comes to 
the nature of the firm. 
In their foundational work on the law and economics of corporate law, 
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel married these two theories into a simple, 
intertwined structure. Their book, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law,54 
reaffirmed the shareholder primacy norm by arguing that shareholders are the 
most economically vulnerable of the firm’s participants. This vulnerability, 
coupled with their shared preference for wealth maximization, means that 
shareholders should be accorded the basic governance rights of the 
corporation.55 Thus, Easterbrook and Fischel contended, the other participants 
in the corporation agreed, through their own contracts, to provide shareholders 
with residual rights to the corporation’s profits and the voting rights that come 
with them.56 The shareholder primacy norm provided the overriding purpose to 
the corporate form, while the nexus of contracts theory demonstrated how the 
parties have reached this arrangement through voluntary agreements. 
From this core law and economics standpoint have blossomed divergent 
approaches to some of the central corporate debates of the last twenty years. One 
group of theorists, most prominently Lucian Bebchuk, focused on providing 
shareholders with stronger legal powers within the corporation.57 Such powers 
include power over corporate political spending, the right to access the 
company’s proxy ballot, and a prohibition on staggered boards.58 Others, such 
as Steven Bainbridge’s director primacy theory59 and Margaret Blair and Lynn 
                                                          
54 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21. 
55 Id. at 67-68. 
56 Id. at 17, 37. 
57 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 883 (2005). 
58 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who 
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for 
Shareholder Access: A Response to the Business Roundtable, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
557 (2005); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The 
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and A Reply to 
Symposium Participants, 55 STAN. L. REV. 885 (2002) 
59 Bainbridge, supra note 3. 
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Stout’s team production theory,60 rallied around various versions of board 
primacy. While these board primacy scholars disagree with each other on the 
appropriate goals of the corporation, they all believe that a governance system 
that’s less responsive to shareholders will allow the board to make better 
decisions.61  
Significantly, all of these theorists, like Easterbrook and Fischel before 
them, are committed to corporate governance structures in which shareholders 
alone elect board members and vote on other matters of importance. And this 
governance feature has long been part and parcel with the broader theory of 
shareholder primacy, which found its strongest justifications in scholars working 
in the law and economics movement. Indeed, even as that movement played out, 
to varying degrees, in many other areas of legal scholarship, it continues to have 
a hammerlock on corporate governance theory. And its original justifications for 
the exclusive shareholder franchise, many of which are now more than four 
decades hold, continue to be cited, recited, and relied upon by many, if not most, 
scholars of corporate governance.62 
 
C. Cracks in the Law-and-Economics Foundation 
While Easterbrook and Fischel’s arguments for the shareholder franchise 
continue to hold sway, some pretty substantial cracks have appeared in their 
foundations. In some cases, their arguments have been found to rest upon 
assumptions about the interests of corporate constituents that do not reflect 
actual constituent preferences. In other cases, their arguments make moves that 
run counter to standard economics or, in some cases, misapply basic principles 
of social choice theory. These shortcomings have been pointed out, and in some 
cases acknowledged, but very little has been done in the way of rehabilitation; 
instead, the old arguments and their dubious assumptions just lumber along 
through the law-and-economics literature. And the main contenders to their 
approach, within the law and economics tradition and from a more progressive 
standpoint, have failed to paper over these original deficiencies or provide a 
compelling alternative vision of the firm.  
As we catalog these arguments and some of their shortcomings, it is 
important to realize that our critiques do not question the basic principles of 
                                                          
60 Blair & Stout, supra note 28.  
61 See Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the Curious 
Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2089-92 (2010). 
62 Including us. 
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standard economics or social choice theory thought to underlie them. Instead, 
we take those principles as given, and discuss their misapplication in the context 
of corporate governance. It’s our sense that corporate governance scholars often 
start from basic economic principles only to discard them when it they run into 
(what they perceive as) problems. These arguments, in other words, will be 
evaluated by the standards that their proponents set for themselves.  
 
1. The Contractarian Argument 
 One of the most basic arguments for the exclusive shareholder franchise is 
that it, like any feature of corporate governance, is presumptively efficient 
because it is the product of freely bargained contracts.63 In this view, the 
corporation itself is nothing more a nexus of contracts.64 Although it often hard 
to tell whether the corporation as contract is intended to be a literal or 
metaphorical description, there is no doubt that it has done heavy rhetorical work 
in the service of the law and economics vision of the corporation. If all corporate 
constituents agree to a governance system in which shareholders alone have 
voting rights, who’s to say they’ve got it wrong?  
 Over time, even the most die-hard contractarians have conceded that this 
description of the corporation is not literally true—there are some key features 
to modern corporations that cannot be reduced to contract.65 The most prominent 
                                                          
63 This argument is given extensive treatment in Hayden & Bodie, supra note 51; Grant 
M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of “Nexus of 
Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2011); Michael Klausner, The 
Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779 
(2006); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of 
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 301 (1999); Lewis A. 
Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on 
Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449 (1989); William W. Bratton, Jr., 
The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 
(1989). 
64 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976) 
(providing the original description of the theory); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, 
supra note 21, at 1-39 (providing one of the most prominent iterations of the theory). 
65 RIBSTEIN, supra note 35, at 67-75 (describing the mandatory elements of the 
corporate structure); Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the 
Corporate Field: A Critique of Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530, 1537 (1989) 
(“Admittedly, as a descriptive matter state corporation codes and other sources of law 
contain many mandatory terms that parties cannot contract around.... [T]o claim that 
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of these is the signature feature of the corporate form: limited liability.66 Limited 
liability cannot be replicated by contract, but is instead, a concession granted by 
the state to corporations in exchange for the ability to tax and regulate them in 
various ways.67 Corporations are not reducible to a set of contracts; indeed, if 
contracts were sufficient, then there would be no need for corporate law in the 
first place.68  
As corporate governance theorists shifted to using the nexus of contracts 
more metaphorically, their reliance on contract theory becomes somewhat self-
defeating.69 Easterbrook and Fischel, for example, argue that corporate law 
provides the “ideal” contract that most participants would themselves develop, 
saving the parties from the transaction costs of developing it on their own.70 This 
argument, though, proves too much, as the theory then assigns itself with the 
task of assigning preferences—something that economists are generally loath to 
do. Moreover, the preferences of these particular hypothetical constituents do 
not reflect the preferences of actual constituents, even the shareholders 
themselves. And there’s certainly no independent reason to think that the rest of 
the corporate constituents would agree on such particularized governance 
features like the exclusive shareholder franchise.71  
This contractarian theory of the corporation turns out to be based on 
idealized, fictionalized versions of shareholders and other corporate 
constituents. And these fictional constituents, by and large, just happen to agree 
with normative law and economics principles and the current structures of 
corporate governance.72 But their supposed approval of every contemporary 
feature of corporate governance is nothing more than Panglossian wish 
fulfillment on the part of their creators. In the end, this argument in favor of the 
                                                          
contractarians would deny the existence of coercive legal rules is to accuse them of 
blindness or stupidity.”). 
66 See RIBSTEIN, supra note 35, at 79; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 63, at 1137-39. 
67 See RIBSTEIN, supra note 35, at 138; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 63, at 1138. 
68 Hayden & Bodie, supra note 68 (“A corporation is not a contract.”). 
69 For a more complete description and critical evaluation of this move to metaphor to 
save the contraction position, see Hayden & Bodie, supra note 51, at 538-46. 
70 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 20, at 1418 (discussing how “much of 
corporate law is designed to reduce the costs of aligning the interests of managers and 
investors”). 
71 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 51, at 539-41. 
72 See id. at 541-42.  For a more extensive discussion of this idea, see Daniel J.H. 
Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: “For Whom is the Corporation Managed,” 
Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1996). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441307 
 
 
 
2020]                                RECONSTRUCTING THE CORPORATION                                    19 
 
exclusive shareholder franchise is both descriptively wrong and normatively 
hollow. 
 
2. The Residual Argument 
The other foundational arguments for the exclusive shareholder franchise 
have also started to wear out their welcome. For example, the principle that all 
shareholders have a similar interest in the corporate residual, the leftover 
operating profit after all the costs have been paid, has long been central to the 
idea of shareholder voting.73 Because maximizing the residual maximizes the 
return to shareholders while leaving all other constituents (like employees and 
suppliers) contractually satisfied, under this theory shareholder control over a 
corporation will increase efficiency by maximizing residual profits.74  
This connection between the residual and control, as calibrated by the “one 
share, one vote” rule, plausibly sets up the proper incentives for maximizing the 
residual and, therefore, the chances for a firm’s success.75 The contested link in 
this argument from the residual, though, isn’t between the residual and control, 
but between the shareholders and the residual. After all, any of the corporation’s 
constituents could be assigned the residual and would then, theoretically, have 
the appropriate incentives to exercise control. The question then becomes why 
should the residual (and the voting rights that go with it) be assigned to 
shareholders alone? Easterbrook and Fischel have an answer to this question: 
shareholders are best positioned to be assigned the residual because they have 
relatively homogeneous interests in wealth maximization. More specifically, 
they alone have a single-minded focus on corporate profits.76 
Over the last couple of decades, however, this assumption of shareholder 
homogeneity has come under quite a bit of pressure.77 Many shareholders have 
interests in the firm that go beyond a simple desire to maximize the residual, 
including majority shareholders, shareholders with disproportionate voting 
rights, members of voting trusts, bribed shareholders, hedged shareholders, 
                                                          
73 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 67-69. 
74 See id. at 35-39; 67-69. 
75 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 73; Bernard Black & Renier 
Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1945-
46 (1996);  
76 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 69-70. 
77 See Goshen & Squire, supra note 7, at 791; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 505. 
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sovereign wealth funds, and employee and management shareholders.78 In each 
case, those shareholders have interests that may temper or override their shared 
interest in the residual. And shareholder heterogeneity is not simply a matter of 
shareholders with discrete competing interests. There is also heterogeneity 
among otherwise similarly situated shareholders with respect to their definitions 
of wealth maximization—shareholders, for example, with different time 
horizons or risk preferences.79 And shareholder wealth maximization is not the 
same thing as shareholder utility maximization. Oliver Hart and Luigi 
Zingales—two luminaries in the field—have suggested that shareholders do in 
fact value things other than profit maximization, and that corporate governance 
should be structured to allow them to express their preferences on tradeoffs in 
corporate decisionmaking.80 Shareholder interests, however you define them, 
are quite heterogeneous, which leaves this second argument in favor of the 
exclusive shareholder franchise on shaky ground.  
Finally, it is simplistic to say that shareholders are the only ones with an 
interest in the long-term value of the corporation. Employees may receive more 
discrete and regular payments, but they too have an ongoing interest in the 
success of the operation. Assuming that employees are paid by “contracts” that 
are set in economic stone makes it easy to ignore that over time, the corporate 
power of shareholders puts workers at a significant bargaining disadvantage.81 
If shareholders alone elect the board, then the board will naturally favor the will 
of their electorate.82 This dynamic has played out over time: wages have 
remained stagnant despite a booming economy, while corporate profits have 
grown at a staggering rate.83 Employees may have some market power, but they 
                                                          
78 See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 561, 574-92 (2006); Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 477-98. 
79 See Anabtawi, supra note 78, at 579-83; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 492-94. 
For a thoughtful review of the short-termism debate, see Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley, 
Short-Termism and Long-Termism 12-21 (Va. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 2, 
2016). 
80 Hart & Zingales, supra note 9. 
81 BLAIR, supra note 47, at 256-57. 
82 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose II: An Encouragement for 
Future Consideration from Professors Johnson and Millon, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1165, 1177 (2017) (“The boards of these corporations did not view themselves as 
having any national loyalties or loyalties to other constituencies, they viewed 
themselves as elected officials in the republic of equity capital.”) 
83 See Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 
1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data (NBER Working Paper No. 20625, 
2014), available at http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/SaezZucman2014.pdf (discussing 
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also have firm-specific capital that cannot be moved, and they generate the value 
that the firm holds through its brand, trademark, and good will.84 Because 
shareholders control the company, they control the brand, the goodwill, the 
ongoing business. Combined with the at-will rule and the dramatic decline in 
union representation, employees have remarkably little power within the firm, 
despite their ongoing interest in the business. 
 
3. The Arrow’s Theorem Argument 
Shareholder heterogeneity also undercuts another fairly prominent 
argument for the exclusive shareholder franchise: the argument from Arrow’s 
theorem. Easterbrook and Fischel first raised concerns, based on Kenneth 
Arrow’s impossibility theorem, that corporate constituents with heterogeneous 
preferences would be more likely to produce intransitive election results, or 
voting cycles.85 This, in turn, would lead firms to “self-destruct.”86 This 
argument has since been repeated by a wide range of law and economics 
corporate governance scholars.87 And, as the argument from the residual fades, 
it seems to have picked up some additional currency. 
Like the argument from the residual, though, the force of this argument is 
diminished by the fact that shareholders actually have quite heterogeneous 
preferences with respect to corporate decisionmaking. But the Arrow’s theorem 
argument falls apart long before we get to the nature of shareholder preferences: 
                                                          
diverging income inequality); Floyd Norris, Corporate Profits Grow and Wages Slide, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/05/business/economy/corporate-profits-grow-ever-
larger-as-slice-of-economy-as-wages-slide.html (discussing the rise in corporate profits 
and fall of employee compensation). 
84 Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Trademarks and the Boundaries of the Firm, 51 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 345, 363 (2009) (“The positive reputation associated with a 
trademark is due to the work of many persons associated with the firm owning that mark 
over time.”). 
85 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 69-70. 
86 Id. at 70. 
87 See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 41-42 (1996); Blair 
& Stout, supra note 28, at 257; Gregory K. Dow, The New Institutional Economics and 
Employment Regulation, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONSHIP 57, 69 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997). 
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it is based on a misguided application of the theorem from the start.88 First, even 
if shareholders agree on an underlying goal of wealth maximization, that does 
not mean they agree on the best strategies or board candidates to achieve that 
goal.89 Second, the argument ignores the enormous democratic cost of avoiding 
possible voting cycles: prohibiting interested parties from voting based upon 
their purported preferences.90 Third, the argument utterly fails to analyze the 
likelihood or cost of cyclical election outcomes in corporate elections, and under 
some fairly straightforward assumptions, both are likely to be very low or 
nonexistent.91 The argument from Arrow’s theorem for the exclusive 
shareholder franchise is not at all compelling. 
 
4. Board Primacy 
Competing corporate law theories in the law and economics tradition 
sometimes offer more realistic stories about corporate law doctrine. But they 
also do little to question the underlying structures of corporate control.92 Stephen 
Bainbridge’s “director primacy” theory well describes the ambivalence of 
Delaware corporate law towards the relationship between shareholders and the 
board of directors.93 But his theory is somewhat lacking in normative punch, as 
it ultimately fails to explain why directors should be given relatively unchecked 
authority over the operation of the firm.94 Similarly, Margaret Blair and Lynn 
Stout’s “team production” model accurately takes into account the many 
participants in the life of the corporation.95 However, their model also leaves it 
to shareholder-elected board to somehow manage these relationships 
appropriately.96 
                                                          
88 For a critical evaluation of this argument, see Grant Hayden & Matthew Bodie, 
Arrow's Theorem and the Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1219 
(2009). For a condensed version, see Hayden & Bodie, supra note 51, at 524-30. 
89 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 88, at 1230-32.  
90 See id. at 1232-34. 
91 See id. at 1234-39. 
92 For an overview and critical evaluation of the various forms of board primacy theory, 
see Hayden & Bodie, supra note 61. 
93 See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008). 
94 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 61, at 2089-2092. 
95 See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 28. 
96 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 61, at 2089-91, 2112-20. 
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Whether they be “Platonic guardians” (Bainbridge)97 or “mediating 
hierarchs” (Blair and Stout),98 there are no governance structures in place to 
ensure that actual directors live up to the faith that these accounts place in their 
ability to manage the firm for all constituents. In both cases, the ultimate check 
on the board is left in the hands of the shareholders alone. And both simply rely 
on earlier law and economics argument to justify the retention of the exclusive 
shareholder franchise.99 Their hearts are in the right place, but those committed 
to board primacy provide no independent arguments for the exclusive 
shareholder franchise. 
 
5. A Return to Corporate Purpose 
Corporate law originally required corporations to establish a specific 
purpose as part of the incorporation process.100 The purpose specified the nature 
of the business to be established and provided a sense of scope. In a real sense, 
the purpose established the legal boundaries of activities for participants within 
the firm.101 Under the law, the corporation could not operate outside of the 
markers of its delineated activity. This limitation was justified by the power that 
the state had provided to the corporation to exist in the first place. The first 
corporations could only be formed for a limited set of prescribed purposes, such 
a starting a university or building a canal.102 But as the scope of potential 
business purposes widened, the need for a specific purpose remained; an 
unlimited corporation could, theoretically, seek unlimited power.103 Therefore, 
                                                          
97 Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 560. 
98 Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 280. 
99 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 61, at 2101-2111. 
100 Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 554–55 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“At first, 
corporations could be formed under the general laws only for a limited number of 
purposes . . . .”). 
101 JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 60 (Arno Press Inc. 1972) (“[T]he general powers of a 
corporate body must be restricted by the nature and object of its institution.”). 
102 Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibility: 
Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1145 (2012) (noting that 
“colleges, guilds, and municipalities were often organized as corporations, as were such 
public-serving transportation ventures as canals or turnpikes”). 
103 Cf. Liggett Co., 288 U.S. at 554–55 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Limitations upon the 
scope of a business corporation's powers and activity were also long universal . . . . The 
powers which the corporation might exercise in carrying out its purposes were sparingly 
conferred and strictly construed.”). 
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corporations needed to specify their purpose as part of their chartering 
documents.104  
The purpose requirement was enforced through a legal action based on ultra 
vires, or “beyond the powers.” Under this doctrine, shareholders could sue the 
corporation if it went beyond the scope of its purpose, as established in the 
charter.105 Because it limited the reach of corporate power to enumerated 
purposes, the ultra vires doctrine was “an important tool to protect the state's 
interest in restricting the power and size of corporations and to protect the 
shareholders from managerial overreaching.”106 Cases typically involved a 
corporation purchasing another company that was outside of the firm’s specified 
scope or carrying on business in violation of its charter.107 In some cases, 
contracts were rendered void if the one party knew that the other party was acting 
ultra vires.108 This led to the odd situation of corporations seeking to escape 
obligations on the grounds that they had exceeded their powers.109 Because of 
                                                          
104 Edward H. Warren, Executory Ultra Vires Transactions, 24 HARV. L. REV. 534, 
534–35 (1911) (“But American legislatures in granting the corporate privilege, either 
by special charter or pursuant to the provisions of a general law, always have been, and 
still are, accustomed to incorporate any given body of associates for some, and not for 
all, purposes.”). 
105 Adam J. Sulkowski & Kent Greenfield, A Bridle, A Prod, and A Big Stick: An 
Evaluation of Class Actions, Shareholder Proposals, and the Ultra Vires Doctrine as 
Methods for Controlling Corporate Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 929, 930 (2005) 
(“The ultra vires doctrine historically allowed a shareholder to sue to prevent a company 
from engaging in an activity outside of the specific parameters of its corporate 
charter.”). 
106 Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality 
(with Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. 
L. REV. 1279, 1302 (2001). 
107 See id.  
108 Recent Cases, Corporations - Ultra Vires - Continuing Contract Made for an 
Unauthorized Purpose, 27 HARV. L. REV. 680, 680 (1914) (finding a contract for the 
sale of coal to a railroad for resale was void if the seller was chargeable with knowledge 
of the railroad's unlawful purpose—namely, to resell the coal outside of its scope as a 
common carrier). 
109 Cf. Colo. Springs Co. v. Am. Pub. Co., 97 F. 843, 849 (8th Cir. 1899) (“The question 
concerning its power to execute the contracts is not raised by the state, but by the 
corporation itself, to avoid a liability to another corporation with which it has 
contracted; and for these reasons a more liberal view may be taken of its implied powers 
than could otherwise be entertained.”).  
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the potential for abuses under this approach, courts began to rein in the 
doctrine.110  
As corporations became more commonplace and less attention was paid to 
the specific charters, the ultra vires doctrine began to break down. Although 
ultra vires prohibitions remain on the books in almost every state,111 
corporations learned to have as broad a corporate purpose as possible.112 Today, 
even though corporations are allowed to have specific purposes, for-profit 
companies generally follow specific language: the corporation is formed to 
conduct and transact all lawful business activities allowed under the laws of the 
state.113 At around the same time as ultra vires actions were disappearing, the 
shareholder primacy norm was beginning to take hold. The goal of shareholder 
wealth maximization became de rigueur at all corporations.114  
However, there is a growing sense in much of the populace that corporations 
should have goals that go beyond merely the creation of wealth for equity 
                                                          
110 See Editorial, Ultra Vires Contracts in the Federal Courts, 19 HARV. L. REV. 608, 
609 (1906) (“In consequence there has been generally adopted a working rule . . . 
making an ultra vires contract neither quite void nor voidable by any particular party, 
nor yet quite good. . . . Thus a wholly executory ultra vires contract is treated as if 
illegal, but if one side has performed, so that such treatment would cause hardship, a 
remedy is given.”). 
111 Sulkowsi & Greenfield, supra note 105, at 945 (“The incorporation statutes of forty-
nine states allow these states to dissolve a corporation or enjoin it from engaging in ultra 
vires activities--that is, activities outside of the corporation's authority.”). 
112 See, e.g., Recent Cases, Corporations - Ultra Vires: What Acts Are Ultra Vires - Ill-
Defined Objects of Incorporation, 32 HARV. L. REV. 285, 290 (1919) (discussing a 
corporate purpose “enabling the company to carry on almost every conceivable kind of 
business which such an organization could adopt”). 
113 Joan MacLeod Heminway, Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held 
U.S. Benefit Corporations, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 611, 618 (2017) (“[F]or-profit 
corporations, including social enterprises organized as corporations, usually take 
advantage of the full breadth of the permitted purposes for which a corporation can be 
organized and operated under the applicable state law.”). 
114 Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
2003, 2004 (2013) (“Many, and possibly most, public companies now embrace a 
shareholder-centered vision of good corporate governance that emphasizes 
‘maximizing shareholder value’ (typically measured by share price) over all other 
corporate goals.”). See also eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 
(Del. Ch. 2010) (““Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors 
are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those 
standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its 
stockholders.”). 
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holders. In part, these critiques stem from alienation directed at the wealth-
maximization norm, which can be viewed as sociopathic in its single-
mindedness.115 But more than that, workers, consumers, and investors are 
increasingly looking for more meaning in their economic activity. This new 
sense of mission is manifesting itself in the growth of organic and sustainability 
consumption116 and socially responsible investing.117 But increasingly, social, 
economic, and environmental concerns are being brought into the corporation 
itself. 
One example of this shift is the growth of business organizations tailored to 
include socially beneficial purposes. Benefit corporations (sometimes called B 
corps) are a form of business organization created by state statutes to promote a 
more socially-responsible orientation within the business.118 The signal change 
                                                          
115 LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S NEWEST 
EXPORT 168 (2001); Ian B. Lee, Is There A Cure for Corporate "Psychopathy"?, 42 
AM. BUS. L.J. 65, 65 (2005) (discussing research that suggests that “the constitutive law 
of corporations is responsible for a monstrous flaw in the institutional character of the 
Anglo-American public corporation--specifically, its exclusive focus on profits”). 
116 Jacob Bunge, Organic Food Sales Are Booming; Why Are American Farmers Crying 
Foul?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-appetite-for-
organic-food-prompts-jump-in-grain-imports-farmers-cry-foul-1487673002; Jeff 
Gelski, Sales growth of organic foods slips to 6.4% in 2017, FOODBUSINESS NEWS, 
May 21, 2018, https://www.foodbusinessnews.net/articles/11853-sales-growth-of-
organic-foods-slips-to-64-in-2017 (noting the continuing annual growth of organic food 
consumption). 
117 Adam Connaker & Saadia Madsbjerg, The State of Socially Responsible Investing, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 17, 2019, https://hbr.org/2019/01/the-state-of-socially-
responsible-investing (noting that “[i]nvestors are increasingly conscious of the social 
and environmental consequences of the decisions that governments and companies 
make”). In an interesting development, employees at Amazon and Google have recently 
promoted shareholder proposals to the board of directors. Kate Conger, Tech Workers 
Got Paid in Company Stock. They Used It to Agitate for Change., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/16/technology/tech-workers-company-stock-
shareholder-activism.html. 
118 See Matthew J. Dulac, Sustaining the Sustainable Corporation: Benefit 
Corporations and the Viability of Going Public, 104 GEO. L.J. 171, 175 (2015) (“A 
benefit corporation is a for-profit corporation with a stated public benefit that operates 
in a responsible and sustainable manner; in other words, it pursues the dual mission of 
making a profit and achieving some social good.”). See Brett McDonnell, Benefit 
Corporations and Strategic Action Fields or (The Existential Failing of Delaware), 39 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 263, 280 (2016) (“State statutes legally define benefit corporations. 
These statutes sit atop the basic business corporation statute. That is, benefit 
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from corporation to benefit corporation is its rejection of the shareholder 
primacy norm for a more socially-beneficial corporate purpose. This purpose 
must fit within the rubric of “social benefit” as defined by the state statute. 
Although most states provide a relatively broad definition,119 the benefit 
corporation restrains itself by opting for a purpose that can then be used as a 
metric. State benefit corporation law usually includes some mechanisms for 
enforcing the “benefit” component, such as benefit reporting, a benefit officer, 
fiduciary duties related to the benefit, or ultra vires actions if the purpose is 
ignored.120  
 Traditionally-organized companies are also feeling pressure to adopt 
purposes and principles beyond maximizing shareholder wealth. There is, of 
course, the possibility that such efforts are primarily for public relations.121 But 
there seems to be an increasing interest in authentic efforts to make a business 
about more than simply making money. At companies that follow participatory 
or self-managed internal governance, the purpose of the organization becomes 
the core around which the organization operates.122 Corporate social 
responsibility experts argue that the principles and purpose should be baked into 
the corporation’s everyday operations.123 Focusing on a purpose above and 
beyond shareholder returns challenges the driving spirit of shareholder 
primacy.124 
                                                          
corporations are business corporations, subject to all of the rules of the business 
corporation statute, except insofar as the benefit corporation statute provides different 
or additional rules.”). 
119 Delaware defines public benefit, as “a positive effect (or reduction of negative 
effects) on 1 or more categories of persons, entities, communities or interests (other 
than stockholders in their capacities as stockholders) including, but not limited to, 
effects of an artistic, charitable, cultural, economic, educational, environmental, 
literary, medical, religious, scientific or technological nature.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 362 (2016). 
120 Heminway, supra note 113, at 618. 
121 See Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV. 
983, 985 (2011) (identifying the problem of “faux CSR”). 
122 See Matthew T. Bodie, Holacracy and the Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 619, 635 (2018) 
(discussing the role of purpose in holacratic organizations). 
123 V. Kasturi Rangan, Lisa Chase & Sohel Karim, The Truth about Investors, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2015, https://hbr.org/2015/01/the-truth-about-csr (contending that 
the main goal of CSR practices should be “to align a company’s social and 
environmental activities with its business purpose and values”). 
124 William Bratton recently arrived at the following alternative description of corporate 
law purpose: 
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6.  Principal Costs & Shareholder Disengagement 
The nonvoting shares distributed in the recent Snap, Inc. initial public 
offering have raised anew the wisdom of deviating from the traditional one-
share, one-vote paradigm.125 Traditionally, corporate governance advocates 
have seen the one share, one vote paradigm as inviolate, and have pressured 
companies to eschew dual-class or non-voting share structures. However, there 
has been a recent and somewhat surprising trend towards a theoretical 
justification for deviations from the one-share, one-vote scheme.  
It is no accident that these arguments come at a time when investments in 
massive, passive index funds is increasing apace.126 Index funds exist solely to 
own shares to an established set of financially successful companies while 
charging fees that are as low as possible. Any effort to investigate the issues at 
play in any particular election, or—in extreme circumstances—to run and fund 
a proxy challenge to incumbent directors, will cost the fund’s participants while 
providing benefits to participants in the other index funds, who spend nothing.127 
Such activity will redound to the detriment of the particular fund, as all funds 
get the benefit but only the particular fund incurs the cost.128 In a world where 
the index sets the investment portfolio, funds compete on cost, and every extra 
analyst becomes an unnecessary luxury.  
                                                          
We set out to frame an accurate and uncontroversial statement of 
purpose for corporate law. Here is the result: corporate law should 
facilitate corporate attempts to maximize productive output (and hence 
wealth) in a competitive economy, encouraging long-term investment 
at the lowest cost of capital, subject to exterior regulations that control 
externalities. Many would expect a tighter focus on maximization, but 
feasibility constraints preclude it. A more specific shareholder value 
objective would be both descriptively inaccurate and controversial. 
Finally, social welfare enhancement, while desirable, lies outside the 
limited sphere occupied by corporate law. 
William W. Bratton, Framing a Purpose for Corporate Law, 39 J. CORP. L. 713, 723–
24 (2014). 
125 Steven Davidoff Solomon, Snap’s Plan Is Most Unfriendly to Outsiders, N.Y. 
TIMES, February 3, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/dealbook/snap-ipo-plan-evan-
spiegel.html. 
126 Lund, supra note 6, at 494. 
127 Id. at 495. 
128 Id.  
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The extraordinary growth of index funds causes substantial problems to a 
corporate governance model based on the shareholder franchise. Voting rights 
require information to be meaningful. If a voter is not informed on the choice at 
hand, the voter will not make a rational choice. Either the voter will still vote, 
introducing whimsy and capriciousness into the process, or the voter will 
abstain. Neither option is effective if the system is built on democratic choice. 
In response to these funds with large masses of insensate stocks, corporate 
law scholars have pushed back against the assumptions of the traditional law and 
economic model. In developing their theory of “principal costs,” Zohar Goshen 
and Richard Squire argue that the field has been too focused on agency costs—
namely, the inefficiencies generated by the delegation of control from 
shareholders to directors and managers.129 They point out that shareholder 
governance decisions can lead to “competence costs,” arising from lack of 
information or talent, and “conflict costs,” relating to the conflicts between 
different goals within the shareholder group.130 Shareholders delegate their 
governance authority to management in order to address these costs.131 In 
particular, shareholder competence costs grow as shareholders become less 
knowledgeable about the corporation and its leadership. The problem of ignorant 
equity holders is so severe in Dorothy Lund’s view that she argues for regulatory 
restrictions on voting rights for large, passive funds.132 Excluding their shares 
from the voting pool will give a larger role to more informed and deserving 
shareholders.133 If voting rights are useless or restricted, then shareholders may 
begin to question their value. Nonvoting shares—an unspeakable taboo for 
modern corporate law—may actually be a better deal if shareholders do not have 
the information sufficient to translate their preferences into voting choices.134  
These new approaches deeply unsettle shared premises of modern corporate 
law theory. And they do so working within the shared normative framework of 
shareholder primacy. One might expect that progressive scholars have proposed 
even more radical deviations from settled corporate law doctrine. Alas, thus far, 
that has not been the case. 
                                                          
129 Goshen & Squire, supra note 7, at 769 (using the term “agency-cost essentialists” 
for scholars who “treat the reduction of agency costs as the essential function of 
corporate law”). 
130 Id. at 770-71. 
131 Id. at 771 (“[P]rincipal costs are more fundamental than agent costs, as the goal of 
reducing them is the reason that investors delegate control to managers . . . .”). 
132 Lund, supra note 6, at 497. 
133 Id.  
134 Lund, supra note 8. 
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D.  Progressive Alternatives 
In contrast to shareholder primacy, progressive corporate law theorists have 
generally advocated for a stakeholder model of the corporation. Also called the 
communitarian or multifiduciary model,135 stakeholder theory argues that 
corporate governance should take all stakeholders in the corporate enterprise 
into account, rather than limiting governance power to shareholders.136 
Stakeholder reforms have generally centered around weakening shareholder 
power within the organizational structure and increasing managerial discretion 
to take other interests into account.137 But stakeholder theory does not provide a 
stable foundation for a theory of corporate governance.  
As an oppositional theory, stakeholder theory has largely served to act as a 
rhetorical brake on some of the excesses of shareholder primacy.138 But it largely 
reinforces the status quo. If anything, stakeholder theory expands upon the 
discretion provided to the board and the management selected by the board to 
follow their own judgment in contravention to the will of the shareholders. The 
most important tangible contribution of stakeholder theory to corporate law has 
been the constituency statute, the law in a majority of states (but not 
Delaware).139 The constituency statute provides directors with the discretion to 
take the interests of all stakeholders into account when making certain types of 
decisions.140 Directors need not take other interests into account, and there is 
                                                          
135 See Simone M. Sepe, Directors' Duty to Creditors and the Debt Contract, 1 J. BUS. 
& TECH. L. 553 (2007) (noting that “communitarians . . . advocate a multifiduciary 
model where all corporate stakeholders benefit from the attribution of directors' 
fiduciary duties”). See also David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: 
Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 11-12 
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (discussing the use of the multifiduciary model by 
communitarian corporate law scholars). 
136 See Millon, supra note 135, at 11-12 (discussing efforts to provide protections to 
nonshareholder constituencies); Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 293-94 (arguing that 
directors owe a duty to the corporation and that the corporation consists of all of the 
stakeholders who are responsible for the business of the enterprise). 
137 Id.  
138 For a discussion of those excesses, see William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side 
of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002); Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time 
Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 975 (2006). 
139 Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State 
Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 215 tbl.1 (2006) (finding 
that thirty-one states have constituency statutes). 
140 Some are limited to takeover/mergers, while others apply to all decisions. Millon, 
supra note 135, at 11-12. 
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generally no remedy for other stakeholders. These statutes are just a way of 
insulating directors from claims that they failed to do enough for shareholders 
when contemplating a tender offer, merger, or factory shutdown. 
The real problem with stakeholder theory is that it is not, at least at present, 
a real theory of firm governance. Stakeholder theory lacks a model for allocating 
governance rights and responsibilities among the participants.141 The theory is 
more in tune with the nexus of contracts approach, as it treats all the participants 
in the firm as deserving of governance consideration. However, it fails to 
develop a system for managing the different stakeholders within the firm. 
Stakeholder theory does not, for example, argue that corporations are simply 
contractual nexuses and thus should not exist as legal entities.142 Nor, more 
surprisingly, have stakeholder theorists sketched out a system whereby all 
stakeholders can participate in firm governance. Instead, stakeholder theorists 
have largely glommed on to the existing structure of corporate law, where 
shareholders elect directors who appoint officers.143  
 
III. THE FIRM AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
If we are to move beyond the current shareholder primacy model of 
corporate governance, we need a theory of governance to ground our new 
conception of the corporation. Economic theory is based, broadly, on the 
principle of efficiency. But there is a subdiscipline of economics that focuses 
particularly on issues of organization and governance. The literature on the 
                                                          
141 See Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, Putting a Stake in Stakeholder Theory, 88 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 605, 611 (2009) (arguing that stakeholder theory fails to provide a system of 
mechanisms for governance, other than “balancing” stakeholder concerns); Joseph 
Heath, Business Ethics Without Stakeholders, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 533, 543 (2006) 
(arguing that stakeholder theory creates “extraordinary agency risks” because of the 
potential for conflicts). 
142 Instead, many stakeholder theorists also ascribe to the entity view of the corporation, 
which argues for treating the corporation as a state-created separate entity. Martin 
Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm-from Nature to Function, 118 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 1, 24 (2013) (“CSR scholars and stakeholder theorists have justified 
consideration of broader stakeholder interests by characterizing the firm as not merely 
a legal fiction but rather as a moral organism with social and ethical responsibilities, or 
built upon the view of the corporation as an entity existing in time and as a distinct 
person.” (citations and quotations omitted)). 
143 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 61, at 2113 (discussing examples). 
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theory of the firm asks: why do we have firms, rather than markets?144 The 
theory of the firm offers a sustained interdisciplinary inquiry into the nature of 
firms and their legal representations.145 While much of the current work in other 
social sciences, such a psychology and sociology, dovetails with economic 
theory and provides additional insights into the basic economic models,146 the 
theory of the firm offers a starting point for these inquiries and a basis upon 
which to build an alternative academic narrative. 
 
A.  Applying the Theory of the Firm to Corporate Governance 
Research into the theory of the firm seeks to answer a fundamental question: 
Why do we even have firms at all? Markets allocate resources based on the best 
information available at the time.147 Firms, however, operate outside of this 
market structure, standing like “lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of 
buttermilk.”148 The law reflects this differentiation, as market transactions are 
generally governed by contract, while firms are created as specific legal entities 
with their own identity—partnerships, corporations, and LLCs, among others. 
Firms are meant to operate outside the market. But why? 
In early neoclassical economics, the theory of firm was quite rudimentary; 
the firm was simply a black box that took in inputs and produced outputs.149 No 
further dissection was undertaken. However, the black box did differentiate 
between what was inside the firm and what was outside: employees and capital 
                                                          
144 Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1757, 1757-65 (1989) (discussing various theories of the firm).  
145 ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (2013); 
Scott E. Masten, A Legal Basis for the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 181 (1988). 
146 See Matthew T. Bodie, The Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law: Returning 
to the Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1033, 1057 (2012) (noting that “the 
different social science disciplines—economics, psychology, sociology, 
anthropology—are increasingly borrowing from one another and bleeding into each 
other's work”). See also THE FIRM AS A COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY: 
RECONSTRUCTING TRUST IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (Charles Heckscher & Paul 
S. Adler eds., 2006) (taking an organizational behavior approach). 
147 Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 520 
(1945). 
148 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937) (quoting 
D.H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 85 (1930)). 
149 Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1459, 1462 (2005) (“The 
predominant model of microeconomics, neoclassical price theory, assumes simply that 
the firm is a black box that maximizes profitability.”). 
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assets were inside, while customers and suppliers were outside.150 Despite its 
crude form, this conception of the firm was useful in early economic modeling 
and retains that purpose even today. 
  An exploration of the internal workings and purpose of the firm begins with 
the work of Ronald Coase.151 In an oft-quoted passage from his concise 
masterpiece, The Nature of the Firm, Coase considered the firm-market 
distinction: 
Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is 
coordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the 
market. Within a firm these market transactions are eliminated, 
and in place of the complicated market structure with exchange 
transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-coordinator, who 
directs production. It is clear that these are alternative methods of 
coordinating production. Yet, having regard to the fact that, if 
production is regulated by price movements, production could be 
carried on without any organization at all, well we might ask, 
why is there any organization?152 
In answering this question, Coase turned to a theory of transaction costs. 
Contracting through markets and using the price mechanism can be costly. For 
certain transactions, Coase posited, it is cheaper to simply direct the production 
to occur rather than contracting for it each time. The hierarchy of the firm allows 
such transactions to be carried out by fiat, rather than through pricing, 
negotiating, and drafting a contract for each transaction.153 In other words, 
hierarchical governance within the firm was more efficient than market 
transactions. 
Coase’s theory of the firm relies heavily on the idea of the employment 
relationship. The structural differentiation between firm and market is the 
relationship between individual employees and the firm’s ownership or 
management. The employment relationship is not based on individual spot 
transactions, but rather an ongoing organizational relationship. As Coase 
famously noted: “If a workman moves from department Y to department X, he 
does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he was ordered 
                                                          
150 Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, 
and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1631 (2001). 
151 Coase, supra note 148. 
152 Id. at 388. 
153 Id. at 390-92. 
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to do so.”154 The relationship between the firm and the employee is the primary 
distinction between the firm and the market. It is the reason for the firm’s 
existence.  
This conclusion was cemented when Coase considered “whether the 
concept of a firm which has been developed fits in with that existing in the real 
world.”155 His answer? “We can best approach the question of what constitutes 
a firm in practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that of 
‘master and servant’ or ‘employer and employee.’”156  He then quoted at length 
from a treatise concerning the common law “control” test, which provides that 
“[t]he master must have the right to control the servant’s work, either personally 
or by another servant or agent.”157 He concluded: “We thus see that it is the fact 
of direction which is the essence of the legal concept of ‘employer and 
employee,’ just as it was in the economic concept which was developed 
above.”158 For Coase, the employer-employee relationship defined the firm.159 
Coase saw the nature of the firm as a hierarchical one in which managers 
controlled the efforts of employees. But the relationship between firm and 
employee need not be hierarchical. In an important response to Coase’s work, 
Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz also focused on the relationship of 
employees with other participants within the structure of the firm.160 However, 
they argued that Coase’s focus on control, authority, and direction was 
misleading.161 They put it this way, memorably: “Telling an employee to type 
this letter rather than to file that document is like my telling a grocer to sell me 
this brand of tuna rather than that brand of bread.” Because employees are 
                                                          
154 Id. at 387. 
155 Id. at 403. 
156 Id.  
157 Id. at 404. 
158 Id.  
159 See Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 265, 296-97 (1998). 
160 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) (“When a lumber mill employs 
a cabinetmaker, cooperation between specialists is achieved within a firm, and when a 
cabinetmaker purchases wood from a lumberman, the cooperation takes place across 
markets (or between firms).”). 
161 Id. (“To speak of managing, directing, or assigning workers to various tasks is a 
deceptive way of noting that the employer continually is involved in renegotiation of 
contracts on terms that must be acceptable to both parties.”). 
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generally hired and fired at will, neither the employer nor the employee is bound 
to continue the relationship by any contractual obligations.162 
Alchian and Demsetz instead took a more holistic approach, focusing on 
the firm’s role in coordinating production in the midst of a variety of inputs. 
Team production is what separated firms from markets. Alchian and Demsetz 
defined team production as “production in which 1) several types of resources 
are used and 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating 
resource.”163 As a result, team production is used when the coordinated effort 
increased productivity, after factoring out the costs associated with monitoring 
and disciplining the team.164 
The lack of “separable outputs” is the key problem that the firm is designed 
to manage. When capital providers and workers join together to carry on a 
business, it is difficult to measure the relative importance or value of the 
individual contributions to that business in a easily measurable and ongoing 
formula. Firms allow these contributors to work together, sell their joint product, 
and then use the firm to manage both responsibilities and spoils. Alchian and 
Demsetz argued that a specialized, independent monitor was likely the best way 
of manage these issues.165 That central monitor—the recipient of the residual 
profits—would be the firm. Although Coase as well as Alchian and Demsetz 
personified this monitor in the role of an “entrepreneur-coordinator,” only sole 
proprietorships achieved this concentration of power. Rather than an individual, 
the central component of team production would be the firm itself: a legal 
“person” who contracts for all other team inputs.166  The legal entity—such as 
the corporation—serves the role of coordinator. 
The Alchian and Demsetz joint-production model includes employees 
within the definition of the firm. Their model’s emphasis on “inputs” broadens 
the scope of the firm to include investors as well as employees. Nevertheless, 
the purpose of the Alchian-Demsetz firm remains the management of employees 
and capital through the coordination of team production. Although they 
                                                          
162 Id. (“Long-term contracts between employer and employee are not the essence of 
the organization we call a firm.”). 
163 Id. at 779. 
164 Id. at 780. 
165 Id. at 782-83. 
166 Alchian and Demsetz set forth the following characteristics of the firm: (a) joint 
input production, (b) several input owners, (c) one party is common to all the contracts 
of the joint inputs, (d) who has the rights to renegotiate any input’s contract 
independently of contracts with the other input owners, (e) who holds the residual claim, 
and (f) who has the right to sell his central contractual residual status. Id. at 783. 
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contribute capital, outside shareholders are relegated to the outer circles of 
power, as Alchian & Demsetz express skepticism about their ability to perform 
the monitoring function. They ask: 
In sum, is it the case that the stockholder-investor relationship is 
one emanating from the division of ownership among several 
people, or is it that the collection of investment funds from people 
of various anticipations is the underlying factor? If the latter, why 
should any of them be thought of as the owners in whom voting 
rights, whatever they may signify or however exercisable, should 
reside in order to enhance efficiency? Why voting rights in any 
of the outside, participating investors?167   
As the theory of the firm literature continued to develop, the identification 
of transaction costs, monitoring costs, and team production remained central 
concepts. Again, the critical question is still why some economic activities take 
place in markets and others take place within firms. Using the transaction-costs 
model, Oliver Williamson and others have identified the types of contractual 
difficulties which are likely to lead to firm governance, rather than market 
solutions.168 In situations where contributions and compensation can be harder 
to define, the parties will be left with incomplete contracts that require a 
governance structure to prevent opportunism.169 This opportunism will be 
particularly problematic where one or both of the parties must invest significant 
resources in assets specific to the particular firm, project, or transaction.170 This 
asset specificity makes the parties susceptible to hold-ups from their contractual 
                                                          
167 Id. at 789 n.14. 
168 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, 
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); Jeffrey T. Macher & Barak D. 
Richman, Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the 
Social Sciences, 10 BUS. & POL. 1 (2008) (discussing transaction costs approach). 
169 Oliver E. Williamson, Why Law, Economics, and Organization?, 1 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. 369, 373 (2005) (“Governance problems are posed when incomplete contracts (to 
include unforeseen contingencies) are combined with opportunism.”). 
170 George S. Geis, The Space Between Markets and Hierarchies, 95 VA. L. REV. 99, 
153 (2009) (“Oliver Williamson has significantly expanded upon Coase's initial insight 
by discussing the importance of bundling relationship-specific assets into a firm to 
avoid counterparty opportunism, and, more generally, by showing how a proper 
conception of transaction costs should include both the direct costs of managing 
relationships and the opportunity costs of suboptimal governance decisions.”). 
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partners in the absence of a system of governance. Firms can be useful in 
providing the structures that deter opportunism.171 
The “property rights” theory of the firm, developed in a series of articles by 
Sanford Grossman, Oliver Hart, and John Moore, argues that firms are necessary 
as a repository of property rights for assets used in joint production.172 By 
owning the property outright, the firm prevents the problem of the commons (in 
which no one holds property rights over valuable assets) as well as the problem 
of the anticommons (in which property rights are divvied up amongst too many 
disparate actors). The Grossman-Hart-Moore model dictates that those who 
contribute the most valuable and most asset-specific property to the joint 
enterprise should control the firm.173 They are not only most necessary to the 
firm’s success; they are also the most vulnerable to hold-up problems as the joint 
enterprise moves forward in time. 
In the transaction costs model, employees’ contributions must be 
recognized as assets of both the firm and the employee—often described as 
“human capital.” Some types of human capital are transferable, such as 
education or general skills, but other types are specific to the firm and generally 
worthless outside it. To the extent an employee has invested in firm-specific 
skills, she is subject to opportunistic behavior, since she has little leverage to get 
the full value of those skills. In the transaction-cost model, employees may be 
precisely the valuable contributors to the joint enterprise who are most 
vulnerable to opportunistic behavior.174 
                                                          
171 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 47-48 (1996); 
Williamson, supra note 168, at 114-15. 
172 See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995); 
Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of 
Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John 
Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988); 
Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. 
ECON. 1119 (1990). 
173 D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 1399, 1404–05 (2002) (“The central insight of the property rights theory of the 
firm is that an appropriate allocation of ownership rights over the assets of a firm 
reduces the likelihood that one party will unfairly take advantage of the other 
participants within the firm.”) 
174 Indeed, Margaret Blair offers the following critique: “The tendency of the 
transactions costs literature has been to recognize that firm-specific human capital raises 
similar questions, but then to sidestep the implications of these questions for corporate 
governance.” Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the 
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The “access” model defines a firm “both in terms of unique assets (which 
may be physical or human) and in terms of the people who have access to these 
assets.”175  Access to the unique assets is what defines the power of the 
individuals within and without the firm. Rajan and Zingales define access as “the 
ability to use, or work with, a critical resource.”176 Examples of critical resources 
include machines, ideas, and people. As Rajan and Zingales make clear, “[t]he 
agent who is given privileged access to the resource gets no new residual rights 
of control. All she gets is the opportunity to specialize her human capital to the 
resource and make herself valuable.”177 Combined with her right to leave the 
firm, access gives the employee the ability to “create a critical resource that she 
controls: her specialized human capital.” Control over this critical resource is a 
source of power. Gordon Smith has further developed this “critical resource” 
theory of the firm in outlining a theory of fiduciary duties that are responsible to 
vulnerabilities created by critical resources.178 
Recent scholarship has taken the role of human capital even further. One 
aspect of this capital—knowledge—has served as the basis for a new set of 
approaches to the firm.179 Knowledge is defined as both explicit sets of formal 
information as well as the ability to apply a repository of unspecified information 
in developing an answer or approach to a particular problem.180 Rather than 
                                                          
Firm, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 58, 66 (Margaret M. Blair & 
Mark J. Roe eds., 2000). 
175 Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. 
ECON. 387, 390 (1998). 
176 Id. at 388. 
177 Id.  
178 Smith, supra note 173, at 1404 (“[T]the critical resource theory reveals that the 
beneficiary's vulnerability emanates from an inability to protect against opportunism by 
the fiduciary with respect to the critical resource.”). 
179 See Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions, and 
Firm Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 
1123 (2007); Sarah Kaplan et al., Knowledge-Based Theories of the Firm: A Review 
and Extension, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 242 (2002). See also Katherine V.W. Stone, 
Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing 
Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721 (2002) (discussing legal conceptions that govern the 
ownership of human capital within the workplace). 
180 For a discussion of explicit versus tacit knowledge, see Ikujiro Nonaka et al., A 
Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation: Understanding the Dynamic Process 
of Creating Knowledge, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING & 
KNOWLEDGE 491, 494 (Meinolf Dierkes et al. eds., 2001). Gorga and Halberstam 
classify knowledge into three types: knowledge embedded in physical assets, 
knowledge embedded in the organizational structure or the group of individuals that 
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emphasize the ownership of physical assets, which can be fungible and non-
specific, the knowledge-based theory focuses on the need to produce, distribute, 
and ultimately retain valuable knowledge-based assets within the firm.181 
Choices between centralized and multi-divisional organizational structures,182 
or between covenants not to compete and employee stock options,183 are made 
to manage the control of knowledge within the firm. Along the same lines, a 
capability-based theory of the firm focuses on firm-specific knowledge and 
learning that can be translated into joint production.184 Under this theory, 
employees as holders of the firm’s capabilities.185 
Knowledge-based theories of the firm serve as something of a bridge 
between the economic, organizational, and sociological theories as to the nature 
of the firm.186 Management historians such as Alfred Chandler have long 
considered the actual roles of employees within the firm to be the centerpiece of 
firm dynamics.187 Organizational theory has built upon these insights and carried 
them over to today’s firms, which generally offer flatter hierarchical structures 
and more work in teams. In fact, one set of scholars examined the role of the 
firm as a “collaborative community” in which employees work together toward 
                                                          
constitute the firm, and specialized knowledge embedded in the individual. Gorga & 
Halberstam, supra note 179, at 1141-42. As they explain, “[t]he way the firm develops 
the knowledge it will use in its production process and the extent that firm can bind this 
knowledge to its structure will influence its organizational structure.” Id. at 1140. 
181 Id. at 1137 (criticizing the property rights theory for failing to account for the 
importance of employees as assets). 
182 Id. at 1173-83. 
183 Id. at 1183-92. Cf. Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and Boundaries of 
Technology Intensive Firms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1686-88 (2009) (discussing the 
role of covenants not to compete in managing innovation within the firm). 
184 Thomas McInerney, Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance, 2004 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 135. 
185 Id.at 139. 
186 See, e.g., Rajan & Zingales, supra note 175, at 424-25 (arguing that there is “ample 
opportunity for gains from trade” between economics and sociology, as sociologists 
have studied the role of power within organizations “in some detail”); D. Gordon Smith 
& Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, (2009) 
(comparing organizational theories to the traditional legal and economic theories of 
contract and firm). 
187 See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 1-12 (1977) (discussing the role of middle- and 
upper-management in coordinating large firms and their employees). 
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common goals.188 Such a firm must have a shared ethos of contribution to a 
collective purpose and the success of others;189 it must be structured so as to 
allow for flexible organizational boundaries but highly specialized 
knowledge;190 it must base status on knowledge and expertise, rather than 
hierarchy;191 and it must create an identity of independence and personal 
consistency.192 Such collaborative-community firms are contrasted with 
hierarchical firms, which manage employees with a traditional command-and-
control structure,193 as well as market-based firms, which break down traditional 
firm barriers through outsourcing and contingent workers.194  
Looking over the trajectory of the theory of the firm, we see that the primary 
concern has been over the shape and internal organization for these entities that 
sit outside of the standard market relationships. And the theories of the firm all 
seem to acknowledge the important role of workers within the firm. Going back 
to Coase, the firm was designed to manage the relationship between those who 
started or managed the business and those who worked for the business. The 
work of the business was best managed internally, rather than through external 
markets. And the firm itself was made up of those who worked for the firm, 
along with a nebulous collection of those who “managed” the firm—also 
workers—and those who “owned” the firm through financial assests. 
 
B. The Legal Construction of Firm Governance 
Because the firm is the primary organizational engine of economic activity 
and growth, the internal governance of the firm takes on supreme importance. 
Of course, the story of modern corporate law is the systematic exclusion of 
employees from governance. But this model is not endemic to economic 
organization. Partnerships, for example, were the original legal structure for 
organizing a group of people into a firm. Unlike corporations, partnerships have 
                                                          
188 See Paul S. Adler & Charles Heckscher, Towards Collaborative Community, in THE 
FIRM AS COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY: RECONSTRUCTING TRUST IN THE 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (Charles Heckscher & Paul S. Adler eds., 2006) 
189 Id. at 39-43. 
190 Id. at 44. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 54-59 
193 Id. at 64-65 (discussing the Wal-Mart approach). 
194 Id. 
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never required an explicit grant of authority from the government to operate.195 
Instead, individuals took it upon themselves to form a partnership under the 
basic guidelines set forth in the law. In addition, courts can determine that a 
group of people had been operating as a partnership, even if they had never 
declared themselves to be partners or considered themselves to be within a 
partnership.196 Instead, the test is whether the parties had formed “an association 
of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.”197 There 
are numerous examples of situations where people working together on the 
assumption that the worker was an employee turned out to be partners according 
to a court.198 
Under the default rules of a partnership, all participants have equal voting 
rights and equal rights to vote on partnership matters.199 The control rights in a 
partnership extend even to ordinary, everyday matters of the business.200 Of 
course, “one partner, one vote” is only the default rule. Partners who 
contemplate varying levels of input and interest will generally construct a 
partnership agreement that allocates votes as well as shares of the residual profits 
according to mutual agreement.201 Partners are free to divvy up voting power 
according to contributions, seniority, experience, involvement, and other factors 
relevant to governance. The default rules are a bit more structured for the limited 
partnership, the limited liability partnership, and the limited liability company. 
These organizations envision participants with stakes in the residual who do not 
participate in management. For example, limited partnerships must make clear 
                                                          
195 See D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 53 
(2004) (“[N]o formalities are required to form a partnership.”); Christine Hurt, 
Partnership Lost, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 491, 497 (2019) (“Partnerships existed at 
common law in England and in the United States before partnership acts were 
promulgated in the 1800s.”). 
196 See, e.g., Bass v. Bass, 814 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tenn. 1991) (holding that “it is not 
essential that the parties actually intend to become partners.”). 
197 Unif. P'ship Act § 6(1), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995); Rev. Unif. P'ship Act § 202(a) 
(amended 1997). 
198 See, e.g., Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886, 891 (Tex. 2009); Holmes v. Lerner, 74 
Cal. App. 4th 442 (1999); Smith v. Redd, 593 So. 2d 989, 991 (Miss. 1991);  
199 Unif. P'ship Act § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995); Rev. Unif. P'ship Act § 401(f) 
(amended 1997). 
200 See Unif. P'ship Act § 18(h), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995); Rev. Unif. P'ship Act § 401(j) 
(amended 1997). 
201 See, e.g., Day v. Sidley & Austin, 394 F. Supp. 986, 992 (D.D.C. 1975) (discussing 
how “statutory rules governing the rights and duties of the partners are ‘subject to any 
agreement between them.”’). 
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who the managerial partners are, and who the limited partners are.202 Limited 
liability companies have what is known as “chameleon” management: “the firm 
can choose either direct partnership-type control by the members or centralized 
control by managers that is closer to, but not as rigid as, the limited partnership 
format.”203 Participants in these enterprises have substantial flexibility in 
arranging the division of ownership and control rights. 
The corporation, in contrast, requires a specific charter from a state 
government to exist and has a fairly uniform governance structure replicated 
across the United States. The shareholders elect the board of directors, and the 
board appoints the officers who run the corporation. Because the legal corporate 
form controls the governance for the economic firm, the two have come to seem 
coterminous. But the corporation represents a shareholder-oriented governance 
structure—one that leaves out other participants. In smaller corporations known 
as closely-held corporations, the same basic corporate structure is used.204 
Because the corporate form’s rigidity does not overlap with the firm, these 
businesses must adapt the corporate form for their purposes. Many closely-held 
companies have different classes of shares as a method of allocating control 
amongst different groups of shareholders.205 In addition, shareholders may agree 
to certain voting arrangements, such as the pooling of votes into a voting trust 
or agreeing to vote along certain lines.206 These voting arrangements are often 
executed to consolidate a group of disparate shareholders into a majority or to 
                                                          
202 See Rev. Unif. Ltd. P'ship Act § 303 (amended 1985), 6A U.L.A. 144-45 (1995). 
However, under the original Uniform Limited Partnership Act, limited partners may be 
subject to liability as managing partners if they participate in the governance. Unif. Ltd. 
P'ship Act § 7 (1916), 6A U.L.A. 336 (1995) (“A limited partner shall not become liable 
as a general partner unless ... he takes part in the control of the business.”). 
203 Larry E. Ribstein, The Evolving Partnership, 26 J. CORP. L. 819, 843 (2001). 
204 See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 
(Mass. 1975) (defining closely held corporations as having “(1) a small number of 
stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority 
stockholder participation in the management, direction and operations of the 
corporation.”). 
205 Preferred stock is particularly common in start-up corporations. Venture capital 
investors prefer to invest with preferred stock, which converts into common stock with 
multiple voting shares if certain triggers are reached. William W. Bratton, Venture 
Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
891, 892 (2002) (noting that “[c]onvertible preferred stock is the dominant financial 
contract in the venture capital market.”). 
206 See, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 486-96 (2000). 
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provide protection to minority shareholders over certain critical matters.207 
Corporate law generally protects minority shareholders against undue 
oppression through specifically-tailored equitable relief. Such oppression often 
relates to the ability of minority shareholders to partake in other aspects of the 
corporate pie—namely, employment.208 Even if shareholders are all sharing 
equally in the profits, the minority oppression doctrine may still order the 
majority shareholders to approve a dividend or to provide employment 
opportunities within the company for minority shareholders.209 
This divergence between the cookie-cutter structure of corporation 
governance and the more tailored approaches of other systems suggests that 
corporations could reconsider their lockstep approach. And in fact, recent 
developments in shareholding structures illustrate a breakdown in the one-share, 
one-vote consensus model. Companies such as Facebook, Google, and the New 
York Times have stock structures that grant the company founders special 
control rights beyond their number of common stock shares.210 Preferred stock 
is also used to provide control rights in certain circumstances, such as the failure 
to make a payment or the approach of the company’s dissolution.211 Companies 
                                                          
207 Perhaps the most famous example of such a trust involves the Ringling family of 
circus fame. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441, 447 (Del. 1947) 
(upholding such a trust). 
208 See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976) 
(finding “no legitimate business purpose” to the majority's decision to suspend a 
minority shareholder's salary, fail to reelect him as a director, and fail to appoint him as 
an officer); Leslie v. Boston Software Collaborative, Inc., 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 379 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. 2002) (minority shareholder terminated from his position as treasurer by 
majority shareholders). 
209 For a further discussion of the protection of minority shareholders vis-à-vis the 
protection of political minorities, see Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and 
Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119 (2003). 
210 Lund, supra note 8. 
211 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW & ECONOMICS 66-67 (2002) 
(“[P]referred stock may have a preference over common stock with respect to dividends 
and/or liquidation”). Preferred shares have often been ignored in the debate about 
shareholder wealth maximization, with the assumption that the shareholders in question 
are the common stock holders. See id. at 66 (noting that preferred stock is “an odd beast, 
neither wholly fish nor wholly fowl”); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A 
Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815, 1820 (2013) (“Preferred stock sits 
on a fault line between two great private law paradigms, corporate law and contract law. 
It is neither one nor the other; rather, it draws on both.”). 
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are getting creative in order to accommodate the special circumstances of their 
particular business firm.212 
More broadly, corporate law needs to dig deeper into the theory of the firm. 
It needs to reexamine the premise that corporate governance is only about 
shareholders, directors, and officers. In particular, corporate law policymakers 
and theorists need to look at all of the corporation’s stakeholders and determine 
if governance rights are appropriate as a way of managing their preferences. 
Prior to recent proposed legislation,213 the corporate law community has not 
seriously entertained any significant changes to the corporate franchise. Even 
those commentators who have suggested a team-production model of corporate 
governance have only asked the board to directors to consider the interests of 
stakeholders.214 With the power structures already in place, it makes little sense 
to imagine a stakeholder-rights theory without any positive governance power 
for stakeholders. As Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine has 
emphasized: 
Under the DGCL [Delaware General Corporate Law] only 
stockholders have the right to vote for directors; approve 
certificate amendments; amend the bylaws; approve certain other 
transactions, such as mergers, and certain asset sales and leases; 
and enforce the DGCL’s terms and hold directors accountable for 
honoring their fiduciary duties. In the corporate republic, no 
constituency other than stockholders is given any power.215 
                                                          
212 See Goshen & Squire, supra note 7, at 773 (“[B]ecause the impact of a given 
governance structure on control costs is firm-specific, there is no particular governance 
structure that can be described as intrinsically good, bad, welfare enhancing, or 
inefficient.”). 
213 See, e.g., Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018); Reward Work 
Act, S. 2605, 115th Cong. (2018). 
214 Hayden & Bodie, supra note 61. 
215 Hon. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed 
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 763–66 (2015); see also 
Hon. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That for-Profit 
Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 135–36 (2012) (“[T]he 
continued failure of our societies to be clear-eyed about the role of the for-profit 
corporation endangers the public interest.”). 
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Voting rights are the only way to provide a real voice to preferences within the 
corporation’s governance structure.216  
 
C.  A Mutual-Control Model of the Firm 
1.  Participation in Joint Production 
Corporations exist to facilitate economic production.217 The corporate form 
is not the same thing as a business; an actual business consists of ideas, 
relationships, economic activity, and legal rights. The corporate form is part of 
this mix.218 The corporation is a legal fiction that creates rights and duties; the 
business firm is the ongoing social phenomenon that we think of when we 
consider companies like Apple, Facebook, and Ford. The legal part of the 
business equation is meant to facilitate the social and economic phenomenon.  
The economic distribution of the responsibilities for production, as well as 
the distribution of the fruits of production, will ultimately rest in the hands of 
those with organizational power. Much of the debate in corporate law over the 
last forty years—perhaps even the last century—has concerned the distribution 
of corporate power between the board, the officers, and the shareholders.219 
Shareholder advocates have pushed for corporate law reforms that provide more 
direct power to stockholders.220 On the other side, management and stakeholder 
advocates have argued that boards need more insulation from shareholders and 
more unreviewable discretion, even if their ultimate aims remain shareholder 
                                                          
216 D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 1399, 1458 (2002) (contemplating that “the key residual ownership right in the 
corporation is the right to elect directors”). 
217 RIBSTEIN, supra note 35, at 4 (“The corporation undeniably has driven business 
growth in the United States since the Industrial Revolution.”). 
218 William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under 
Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1521 (1982) (suggesting that “the most useful way to 
analyze the modern business enterprise is to interpret the terms of the economic 
arrangements of a firm (partnership, corporation, cooperative) and the terms of the 
related economic arrangements that should not be analyzed separately from the firm 
(distributorship, loan agreement, employment contracts) as a series of bargains subject 
to constraints and made in contemplation of a long-term relationship”). 
219 For the beginnings of the debate over the separation of ownership and control, see 
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932). See also Jensen & Meckling, supra note 64  (discussing the problem 
of agency costs in light of the separation of ownership and control). 
220 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 57. 
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wealth maximization.221 In this second group, there is a subset of advocates who 
argue that stakeholders such as employees, creditors, consumers, and 
communities deserve some protection within the process.222 But stakeholder 
supporters generally provide directors with the freedom to merely consider all 
stakeholder interests, rather than granting voting power to these stakeholders.223    
If the firm is designed to help manage a system of joint production, then the 
governance of the firm should include those who participate in the joint 
production. The distinction between markets and firms is this distinction 
between the use of straightforward contracts to manage relationships and the 
need for governance mechanisms to manage relationships. 224 Firms involve the 
complexities of ongoing joint production between participants who cannot 
reduce their interactions simply to contractual performance metrics. Instead, the 
participants create another entity—the firm—to serve as the locus of their 
production and to structure both the inputs required by the participants and to 
divvy up the outputs amongst them. 
Shareholders and employees are invested in the firm in such a way that they 
need firm governance to protect against opportunism. When it comes to their 
contractual vulnerability, shareholders are in fact situated differently from other 
capital providers (such as creditors).225 Shareholders invest their money into the 
firm with no ability to withdraw it and subject to uncertain payoffs, largely at 
the discretion of management.226 Employees are also firm investors. They have 
invested their labor, reputations, and firm-specific individual capital in the firm 
                                                          
221 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 550; Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The 
Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733, 754 (2007); Lynn A. Stout, The 
Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 804–05 (2007). 
222 See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 313. 
223 Hayden & Bodie, supra note 61, at 2113 (discussing the “strange turn” against 
stakeholder board representation). 
224 See Bengt Holmstrom, The Firm as a Subeconomy, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 74, 80 
(1999) (“When contracts are incomplete in the sense that they cannot incorporate all 
future contracting opportunities, governance becomes consequential.”). 
225 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 68–69; Benjamin Means, A 
Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161, 
1197 (2010) (discussing the problem of “shareholder oppression” and vulnerability, and 
the inability of contracts to unequivocally protect such shareholders). 
226 See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for 
Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 392 (2003) 
(citing the importance of “resource commitment” or capital lock-in as a critical reason 
for the success of the corporation as a private enterprise). 
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and cannot not pull these investments out.227 Under the law, they are 
compensated on a more regular basis, and with less discretion, than 
shareholders.228 However, they still operate within the firm, as opposed to 
suppliers and outside contractors who provide their services through markets.229 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
227 See Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 
302 (1998) (noting that firm-specific skills “make a worker more valuable to her present 
employer, but also make her more vulnerable to a firm’s opportunistic behavior”); 
Andrew Keay, Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: Has It Got What It Takes?, 9 
RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 249, 368 (2010) (“For instance, employees may make an 
investment in corporations by way of undergoing specialised training that might not be 
able to be used elsewhere in other employment.”). 
228 As late as the nineteenth century, employees worked for terms as long as a year and 
were not entitled to any contractual payment if they left before the end. See, e.g., Stark 
v. Parker, 19 Mass. 267, 292–94 (1824) (denying any contractual recovery for an 
employee who left after nine months of a twelve-month job); Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 
481, 491–92 (1834) (denying contractual recovery but allowing for recovery under 
restitution). Now, however, wage and hour laws require payment for time worked and 
periodic payments made to the employee. See generally Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 
(2012)). 
229 There may be certain exceptions in unusual situations. See HANSMANN, supra note 
87, at 149–223 (discussing specific instances of customer-owned enterprises); David G. 
Yosifon, The Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 253 (2009) 
[hereinafter Yosifon, Consumer Interest] (arguing that consumers are inadequately 
represented in corporate governance); David G. Yosifon, Consumer Lock-in and the 
Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1429, 1430 (2012) [hereinafter Yosifon, 
Lock-in] (concluding that “a departure from the shareholder wealth maximization norm 
and an embrace of a multi-stakeholder corporate governance regime may be necessary 
to overcome agency problems associated with consumer lock-in”). 
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Fig. 1 
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The theory of the firm supports a governance model that includes 
employees. Theory of the firm scholars have long appreciated the importance of 
the employee to our conception of the firm.230 In fact, Ronald Coase looked to 
the relationship between employer and employee to demonstrate empirical 
support for his theory of the firm.231 Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz argued 
that the importance of the firm (as separate from the market) stems from the need 
to coordinate production from a variety of inputs.232 Team production is used—
and firms replace markets—when the coordinated effort increases productivity, 
after factoring out the costs associated with monitoring and disciplining the 
team.233 Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout relied on this notion of team production 
in developing their stakeholder-based theory.234 But the non-separable inputs 
within team production really belong to employees and shareholders.235 
                                                          
230 See generally Coase, supra note 148, at 401–05. 
231 See id. at 403 (“We can best approach the question of what constitutes a firm in 
practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that of ‘master and 
servant’ or ‘employer and employee.’”). 
232 See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 160, at 778 (describing the firm as a “centralized 
contractual agent in a team production process”). 
233 Id. at 780. 
234 See Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 275 (analyzing the “team production problem” 
arising “when a number of individuals must invest firm-specific resources to produce a 
nonseparable output”). 
235 See id. at 249 (“If the team members’ investments are firm-specific . . . and if output 
from the enterprise is nonseparable, . . . serious problems can arise in determining how 
any economic surpluses generated by team production . . . should be divided.”). 
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Shareholders provide capital that is taken within the firm and turned into 
discretionary funds.236 Employees work together under the aegis of the firm to 
produce goods or services in a manner that generally cannot be separated out to 
assign specific values.237 Other participants are not integrated into the team 
production process, and, thus, do not need to work within the firm.238 Creditors 
provide money on fixed terms.239 Suppliers and independent contractors provide 
specific services outside of the firm’s scope. Consumers purchase the goods or 
services after the production process is complete.240 And the surrounding 
community regulates the firm as it does all other individuals and organizations 
within its jurisdiction. If we say that all of these participants are engaged in the 
production process, it proves too much—then all participants in the market 
would be engaged in commerce with one another. It is only when we have a 
team production process—when the parties cannot effectively use the market—
that we need to create a firm and facilitate the process of team production.241 
Employees and shareholders are part of that team production process in a way 
that stakeholders outside the firm are not.242 
                                                          
236 See id. at 277 (“Providers of financial capital—shareholders and even, potentially, 
some creditors—are, by this agreement, just as ‘stuck’ in the firm as are providers of 
specialized human capital.”). 
237 Id. at 261. 
238 See id. at 269 (arguing that “employees, shareholders, and executives” are the main 
players on the corporate “team”). 
239 But cf. Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical 
Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1652–55 (2002) (arguing that “[t]here is 
no doubt that creditors who loan money to publicly held corporations thereby make a 
team-specific investment” but that they are “less vulnerable to opportunism when 
trading with publicly held corporations” when compared to other team members). 
240 See Yosifon, Consumer Interest, supra note 229, at 259 (discussing the cabined role 
of some consumers in the transacting process). 
241 See id. at 265 (“If the activities and inputs of those participants are adequately 
coordinated, their collective output can be qualitatively different and vastly larger than 
the sum of what each individual could produce separately.”). 
242 Some stakeholder theorists have advocated specifically for employee governance 
rights. GREENFIELD, supra note 29, at 112 (advocating for a special role for employees 
in corporate law, including the possibility of board representation); Brett H. McDonnell, 
Strategies for an Employee Role in Corporate Governance, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
429, 430–31 (2011) (evaluating “a number of possible strategies for creating a role for 
employees in corporate governance”); see also Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, 
or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334, 334 
(2008) (promoting employee primacy); Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the 
Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing A Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced 
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Concern for the fates of other stakeholders is understandable and may, in 
some circumstances, warrant a species of governance protection.243 Creditors, 
for example, may receive specific protections when the company is close to 
bankruptcy as a way of mitigating their particular vulnerabilities in such 
situations.244 Certain consumers may have the type of long-term, invested 
interests, such that some governance and/or ownership rights may make 
sense.245 In the main, however, government regulation will be the most 
straightforward way of managing issues that arise and are not amenable to 
contractual resolution. Creditors have statutory rights within bankruptcy.246 
Consumer protection laws can place mandatory terms or disclosure requirements 
                                                          
Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991); Marleen O’Connor, Labor’s Role in the 
American Corporate Governance Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 97 (2000). 
Others have noted that employees have a stronger or the strongest case amongst 
stakeholders for participation in governance. Millon, supra note 135, at 14 (noting that 
“[t]he most compelling theoretical arguments for nonshareholder protection have 
focused on employees,” and that “the relative inadequacy of bargaining power and other 
disadvantages may more seriously impede bargained-for protection for employees than 
for other nonshareholder groups”). 
243 See Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 275 (“[T]he public corporation is not so much a 
‘nexus of contracts’ (explicit or implicit) as a ‘nexus of firm-specific investments,’ in 
which several different groups contribute unique and essential resources to 
the corporate enterprise, and who each find it difficult to protect their contribution 
through explicit contracts.”). 
244 See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as Means to an 
End, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 255, 296 (2015) (“[C]ourts should revert to their traditional 
focus on policing against the bargaining failures that can occur when investors use 
directors to address the incomplete contracting challenges that are replete in corporate 
finance.”); Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of 
Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115, 119 (2009) 
[hereinafter Tung, Leverage] (arguing that “bank creditors and other private lenders 
often enjoy significant oversight and influence over managerial decisions”). For a 
discussion of the possible expansion of fiduciary duties to creditors, see Frederick Tung, 
The New Death of Contract: Creeping Corporate Fiduciary Duties for Creditors, 57 
EMORY L.J. 809, 814–15 (2008) [hereinafter Tung, Fiduciary Duties]. 
245 See HANSMANN, supra note 87, at 149–68 (discussing consumer ownership); 
Yosifon, Lock-In, supra note 229, at 1449–59 (discussing types of lock-in situations). 
246 See Tung, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 244, at 842 (“By the time the firm is in 
distress, its creditors will enjoy differing rights (including payment and priority rights), 
differing stakes in the continuation of the borrower firm, and differing contract 
protections.”). 
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on firms.247 Environmental protections address externalities by imposing costs 
on firms (and individuals) for creating those externalities.248 But corporate 
governance, like all firm governance, should be addressed to solving problems 
that arise within the firm structure—problems related to team production.249 
Employees and shareholders are engaged in the process of team production 
within the firm.250  
 
  2.  Information within the Firm 
   A mutual-control model of firm governance better reflects the flow of 
information within the firm. Information has always been the strange paradox at 
the heart of corporate law theory. Shareholders delegate governance power to 
management because they do not have the time or resources to get the 
information necessary to make independent governance decisions. And yet 
shareholder primacy asks shareholders to vote with sufficient knowledge and 
understanding to curb agency costs and direct the corporation efficiently. This 
paradox has come into fuller view of late, as theorists raise powerful concerns 
                                                          
247 Cf. Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of Consumer Protection Law, the 
Institutionalization of Consumerism, and Future Prospects and Perils, 26 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1147, 1169 (2010) (“Despite the many state and federal statutes that have been 
enacted in the last forty years to regulate consumer transactions, the underlying contract 
between the company and the consumer remains crucial in determining the rights and 
liabilities of the parties.”). 
248 Individual shareholders at individual companies can no doubt use corporate law and 
governance to advance environmental concerns. See Sarah E. Light, The Law of the 
Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137, 140 (2019) (“In light of the 
significant impact that firms can have on the environment (often, though not always, 
when they are organized as publicly traded corporations), this Article argues that the 
law governing the corporation throughout its life cycle—corporate law, securities 
regulation, antitrust law, and bankruptcy law—should be understood as a fundamental 
part of environmental law.”). 
249 See Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 250 (“[P]ublic corporation law can offer a 
second-best solution to team production problems because it allows rational individuals 
who hope to profit from team production to overcome shirking and rent-seeking by 
opting into an internal governance structure we call the ‘mediating hierarchy.’”). 
250 Note that a mutual-control governance structure for the firm would still align with 
William Bratton’s description of the corporate purpose: “corporate law should facilitate 
corporate attempts to maximize productive output (and hence wealth) in a competitive 
economy, encouraging long-term investment at the lowest cost of capital, subject to 
exterior regulations that control externalities.” Bratton, supra note 124, at 723–24. 
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about the “competence costs” of principal governance251 and the voting rights of 
passive funds.252 
  Employees have information about the firm that they obtain through their 
everyday experience with the company without additional cost. Yet they have 
no formal governance mechanisms for using this information to help guide the 
company. The overwhelming majority of private sector employees are not 
represented by a union.253 Even if employees are represented by a union, that 
union has not formal right to bargain with the company over issues of managerial 
prerogative, such as new product lines, marketing, acquisitions, or the 
composition of the board.254 The formal mechanism for employee input is the 
proverbial suggestion box. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, both academic and popular business literature 
explored ways in which firms could better process and utilize information held 
by employees.255 The success of Japanese businesses led many to investigate 
ways in which Japanese firms better integrated employee decisionmaking.256 
Internal systems involving “quality circles” and “quality improvement teams” 
                                                          
251 Goshen & Squire, supra note 7. 
252 Lund, supra note 6. 
253 Union Member Summary, BUREAU L. STAT. (Jan. 18, 2019), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (finding that 6.4% of private-sector 
employees are unionized). 
254 Employers only need to bargain about terms and conditions of employment; they 
need not discuss areas within the “core of entrepreneurial control.” NLRB v. Wooster 
Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (discussing the mandatory 
subjects of collective bargaining); SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MATTHEW T. BODIE, 
LABOR LAW 134-39 (2016). 
255 For a sampling of the legal academic literature—much of it involving employee 
ownership—see MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL (1995); THE NEW 
RELATIONSHIP: HUMAN CAPITAL IN THE AMERICAN CORPORATION (Margaret M. Blair 
& Thomas A. Kochan eds., 2000); JOSEPH R. BLASI, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: 
REVOLUTION OR RIPOFF? (1988); HANSMANN, supra note 87, at 66-119; SAUL A. 
RUBENSTEIN & THOMAS A. KOCHAN, LEARNING FROM SATURN: POSSIBILITIES FOR 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS (2001); PAUL WEILER, 
GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE (1990); Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 
67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 159, 160 (1991). 
256 See, e.g., ROBERT E. COLE, WORK, MOBILITY, AND PARTICIPATION: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMERICAN AND JAPANESE INDUSTRY (1980); Jon Gertner, 
From 0 to 60 to World Domination, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2007 (Magazine), at 34. 
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were heralded as a way of drawing employee know-how into daily operations.257 
Such methods stood in opposition to hierarchical management structures and the 
Taylorist method of production, which held that managers generated the 
information and disseminated it down the ladder.258 Although many of these 
structures are in use today,259 they almost always do not extend power to the 
higher reaches of the corporation, where true power sits. 
This gap between knowledge on the employees’ part and power on the 
shareholders’ part seems inefficient. Shareholders and employees could work 
together to pool their information and their power to police decisions of 
management. To take just one example: the process of carrying out a corporate 
combination, such as a merger or sale of substantially all assets, generally 
follows a prescribed pattern. After some set of the top corporate officers agree 
to the deal, the companies must secretly and expeditiously conduct due diligence 
using high-level management and outside consultants. If this hastily-conducted 
due diligence uncovers no problems, the boards approve the combination and 
announce the deal to the public and shareholders. The shareholders generally 
have a couple months to digest the proxy materials and media reports before 
they vote to approve or quash the merger. If the combination receives 
shareholder and regulatory approval, the combination ultimately goes into 
effect.260 There are strategic reasons for the structure of this process: secrecy 
prevents poaching and keeps failed negotiations under the rug.261 While this 
secrecy serves a purpose, it also narrowly restricts both the information and the 
perspectives that can be brought to bear. As a result, corporate combinations are 
extremely top-down affairs. From start to finish, the typical corporate 
                                                          
257 See, e.g., JOSEPH M. JURAN, QUALITY BY DESIGN (1992); DAVID I. LEVINE, 
REINVENTING THE WORKPLACE: HOW BUSINESS AND EMPLOYEES CAN BOTH WIN 
(1995); PAUL LILLRANK & NORIAKI KANO, CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT: QUALITY 
CONTROL CIRCLES IN JAPANESE INDUSTRY (1989); Erin White, How a Company Made 
Everyone a Team Player, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2007, at B1. 
258 See Katherine V.W. Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing 
Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 143-46 (1988) 
(discussing Taylorism in the workplace). 
259 New managerial methodologies providing for participatory management and 
employee voice are increasingly popular around the globe. See, e.g., LALOUX, supra 
note 13; ROBERTSON, supra note 13. 
260 For a discussion of this phenomenon in the context of the AOL-Time Warner merger, 
see Matthew T. Bodie, AOL-Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy, 
31 J. CORP. L. 975 (2006). 
261 See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234-35 (1988) (discussing the 
importance of keeping merger negotiations secret). 
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combination is hampered by the absence of critical information. Employees are 
a natural fit to help overcome this information deficit—they have specialized 
information from the shop floor that is often undervalued by expensive corporate 
consultants.262  
Employees also have information about the agency costs associated with 
managerial opportunism—information that shareholders are not likely to have. 
While directors may be expected to police such opportunism, there are a variety 
of reasons to doubt their effectiveness. First, the directors themselves may be in 
on the deal; the firm may decide to award bonuses to directors as well as 
managers.263 Second, directors may already feel beholden to managers. Top-
level executives have significant power over the board nomination and 
reelection process264 as well as the directorial compensation process.265 Personal 
ties help cement the feelings of loyalty and friendship.266 Third, directors are 
part-timers; they themselves do not have the same quantity and depth of 
information that employees have. Boards may end up trusting that investment 
bankers, compensation consultants, and other advisors have dealt with the 
compensation issue sufficiently, when in fact these advisors have their own set 
of conflicts.267 
                                                          
262 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL 
DIVIDE: POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY 231-36 (1984) (discussing the practice of 
“flexible specialization” on the shop floor). See also MIKE ROSE, THE MIND AT WORK: 
VALUING THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE AMERICAN WORKER xxxiv (2004) (discussing the 
various intelligences of different types of workers). 
263 See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 331-33 (Del. Ch. 1997) (discussing the issues 
surrounding a stock option grant to directors). 
264 LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 25-27 (2004). 
265 Id. at 27-31 (discussing how top-level managers can financially reward directors). 
266 Brian G.M. Main, Charles A. O’Reilly III & James Wade, The CEO, the Board of 
Directors, and Executive Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 4 
INDUS. & CORP CHANGE 292 (1995). 
267 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 264, at 37-39. See also In re Walt Disney 
Shareholders’ Litigation, 907 A.2d 693, 704-11 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 
2006) (discussing the process through which Michael Ovitz was hired by Walt Disney 
in 1995). Despite denying the duties of care and good faith challenge against the Ovitz 
hiring, Chancellor Chandler acknowledged that “the compensation committee met for 
one hour” to discuss the terms of Michael Ovitz’s compensation along with the 
compensation packages for various Disney employees, 121 stock option grants, top-
level executive Robert Iger's employment agreement, and board member and 
compensation committee chair Irwin Russell's $250,000 compensation for negotiating 
the Ovitz deal. Id. at 708 (emphasis in the original). 
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Employees are ideally situated to join with shareholders in an effort to 
police management. Indeed, this already appears to be taking place. Labor 
unions, for example, have become much more involved in traditional corporate 
governance activism.268 In the 1980s, unions were generally antagonistic to 
shareholder concerns and supported anti-takeover tactics such as constituency 
statutes.269 However, unions and union-associated pension funds have joined the 
side of shareholders in pushing through shareholder-friendly corporate 
governance measures.270 Pension fund managers have been at the forefront in 
governance efforts to strengthen shareholder voting rights,271 rein in the power 
of the CEO,272 and fight fraud and abuse by insiders.273 These measures suggest 
an ongoing role for union activism: an alliance with shareholders in an effort to 
maximize long-term growth for shareholders and other stakeholders. Employee 
board representation would provide a conduit for this kind of agency-costs 
information for the 93 percent of private-sector employees who are not 
represented by a union.274 Regardless of their situation, employees have an 
interest in working with shareholders to prevent executives from taking 
advantage of the other stakeholders in the company.  
 
D. Outside the Firm: Stakeholder Theory 
Those who are outside the firm should not participate in governance. They 
may, of course, participate in the joint production, but they participate through 
markets—their interests are reducible to contractual performance. Creditors 
provide capital, but they do so under very different terms than shareholders. 
While shareholders provide funds with no expectation of repayment, creditors 
have a contractual right to repayment, generally with interest, and may also have 
secured rights to property interests if the loan is not repaid per the terms. 
                                                          
268 See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: 
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018 (1998). 
269 Id. at 1036. 
270 Id. at 1045. (“The amazing thing about these union-sponsored shareholder proposals 
is how ordinary they are, from the perspective of any institutional investor.”). See 
generally DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: 
LABOR’S LAST BEST WEAPON (2018).  
271 WEBBER, supra note 270, at 45-78. 
272 Id. at 111-51. 
273 Id. at 164-80. 
274 Union Member Summary, BUREAU L. STAT. (Jan. 18, 2019), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (finding that 6.4% of private-sector 
employees are unionized). 
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Suppliers and independent contractors may provide goods or services that are 
used within the process of joint production. But their contributions are discrete 
and can be completed on the market. Moreover, these goods or services are often 
provided in the context of a separate firm—one that exists apart from the firm at 
issue. A painting contractor could not operate without buying the pain from a 
supplier, but that supplier is itself a firm that makes and sells paints to a variety 
of customers. That does not make the supplier a part of the painting contractor’s 
firm. All of the economy is interwoven, but we still can draw a distinction 
between firms and markets. This dichotomy between firm and market may elide 
greater complexity in relationships, as recent examinations of joint ventures and 
“braided” contracts has revealed.275 But complications in categorization do not 
mean that the separate categories do not exist. 
This largely delineated dichotomy between firms and markets has been 
complicated in corporate law by the background burbling of stakeholder theory 
as an alternative to shareholder primacy. Stakeholder theory, remember, holds 
that corporate governance should take all stakeholders in the corporate 
enterprise into account.276 But it lacks a model for allocating governance rights 
and responsibilities among the participants.277 
Stakeholder theory could develop a new system of corporate governance 
giving all stakeholders direct ways to participate in firm governance. But the 
theory would have to do the difficult work of assigning rights to all participants 
in a meaningful way—beyond the contractual protections they already hold. The 
whole point of firm governance is to move beyond contract.278 Yet stakeholder 
theory seems content with the current power structure, as long as directors do 
not get too beholden to their electorate. This approach is not internally coherent. 
                                                          
275 See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sable & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction 
of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1377, 1382 (2010); see also Geis, supra note 170, at 100. 
276 See Millon, supra note 135, at 11–12 (discussing efforts to provide protections to 
nonshareholder constituencies); Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 293–94 (arguing that 
directors owe a duty to the corporation and that the corporation consists of all of the 
stakeholders who are responsible for the business of the enterprise). 
277 See Joseph Heath, Business Ethics Without Stakeholders, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 533, 
543 (2006) (arguing that stakeholder theory creates “extraordinary agency risks” 
because of the potential for conflicts); Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, Putting a Stake in 
Stakeholder Theory, 88 J. BUS. ETHICS 605, 611 (2009) (arguing that stakeholder theory 
fails to provide a system of mechanisms for governance, other than “balancing” 
stakeholder concerns). 
278 See Coase, supra note 148, at 391–93 (discussing why production is organized 
through firms, rather than markets). 
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It makes little sense to attack shareholder primacy but then maintain the 
exclusive shareholder franchise.279 Stakeholder theory has failed to present a 
viable alternative to the status quo/shareholder primacy model; at best, it 
advocates for a watered-down version of shareholder primacy. 
Some stakeholder theorists argue that a stakeholder approach is the best 
way to incorporate community or societal interests within firm governance. 
However, the community has a more powerful tool than firm governance for 
influencing the firm: regulation. Governments can place restrictions on firms 
that manage their behavior regardless of their internal governance structure. 
Society has tools far more powerful than a voice within the governance structure. 
And because society has interests that transcend firm boundaries, it does not 
have a first-order set of interests in the allocation of the responsibilities and 
benefits of joint production of a particular firm. It is not surprising that 
stakeholder theorists provide no real participation mechanism for society within 
firm governance—merely a vague commendation to the board to take societal 
interests into account. 
There may be certain circumstances in which a particular stakeholder may 
be sufficiently enmeshed in the workings of the firm, or may be particularly 
vulnerable to opportunism, that firm governance rights would better manage the 
relationship between the firm and the stakeholder.280 However, as a matter of 
course, only shareholders and employees participate in the firm in a way that 
should entitle them to governance rights.  
 
IV. DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION 
AND THE MUTUAL-CONTROL MODEL 
 When it comes to the corporate franchise, the theory of the firm provides a 
solid economic foundation for separating the interests of shareholders and 
employees from those of other corporate constituents. It is not, however, the 
only theoretical justification for that separation. In this part, we explore the 
                                                          
279 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 61, at 2113 (discussing the “strange turn” from 
stakeholder theory to the exclusive shareholder franchise). Stakeholder theorists have 
acknowledged this difficulty. See Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 312 (“Recognizing 
that shareholder voting rights can act as a safety net to protect against extreme 
misconduct poses something of a problem for the mediating hierarchy approach, as it 
suggests that shareholders enjoy more control over how the firm is run than do other 
members of the coalition.”). 
280 For a discussion of various ownership structures for different types of firms, see 
HANSMANN, supra note 87. 
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lessons that democratic theory has to offer to corporate governance. In 
particular, we look at governance from the broad perspective of preference 
aggregation and develop a theory of democratic participation that allows us to 
determine whose preferences are best captured through voting rather than 
contract. We then apply that framework to corporate governance and find that 
it, too, counsels in favor of a mutual-control model.  
 
A.  Corporations and Democracy 
All of the institutions that comprise modern market-based societies—from 
large governments to small businesses—employ decisionmaking structures 
designed to take account of the preferences of their constituents. They 
sometimes rely upon compacts or contracts, which are thought to ensure the 
preference satisfaction of everyone involved.281 Once institutions reach a certain 
size and complexity, though, contracts alone cannot do the job: they must resort 
to some type of voting mechanism to aggregate preferences. This is true of 
almost all institutions, both political and corporate, that claim to serve some sort 
of constituency. It is certainly true of the modern corporation. 
Since corporate governance involves, at least in part, the use of voting 
mechanisms to aggregate preferences, it seems reasonable to turn to political 
theory in analyzing its structures and relationships. Public choice theory, with 
its emphasis on the interests of different groups and its analysis of the effect of 
different structures on outcomes, would seem to present a natural methodology 
for studying corporate governance.282 More generally, political theory concerns 
the allocation and transfer of power in decisionmaking and the roles of different 
institutions in the governance of a polity. That said, economics, so far, has 
dominated corporate law to the almost complete exclusion of political theory, 
perhaps because corporate law theorists are sometimes suspicious of political 
analogies (despite borrowing what they think is useful).283 And while we 
                                                          
281 See, e.g., Stephen E. Ellis & Grant M. Hayden, The Cult of Efficiency in Corporate 
Law, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 239, 248–49 (2010). 
282 See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 
(1991). 
283 See Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 256-57, 323-24; Ian B. Lee, Citizenship and the 
Corporation, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 129 (2009) (discussing how economic theory 
has dominated corporate law and arguing that political theory should play a larger role). 
Public choice theory has been used in corporate law in the context of competition 
between states, competition within states, and competition between the states 
(particularly Delaware) and the federal government. See, e.g., RALPH WINTER, 
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obviously think economics has its place in the discussion, politics may also be 
instructive at the fundamental level of the structure of the corporation. 
This is not to say that political and corporate institutions, or political and 
corporate voting, are the same thing. For example, those who currently vote in 
corporate elections—shareholders—may enter and exit the corporation more 
freely than citizens can move between polities; and shareholder voting, as 
currently structured, is a relatively meaningless exercise in terms of exerting 
influence over most corporate decisions.284 These points are well taken. But at 
some level of generality, both types of institutions purport to have governance 
structures designed to aggregate preferences. The purpose of a system of 
governance is to manage different interests despite the opportunities for 
conflict.285  
For that reason, examining how voting works in political institutions may 
help illuminate some of the arguments around corporate governance. The 
disagreements over corporate governance law, after all, aren’t usually about 
whether corporations should be structured to maximize the preference 
satisfaction of their constituents, broadly defined, but how best to do so. The 
same types of questions animate discussions of both political and corporate 
voting. One central set of questions, of course, is which constituents count, and 
how do we identify them and best capture their preferences? But there are other, 
related questions as well. Should the voting system be direct, representative, or 
some mixture of the two? If representative, what is the basis for representation, 
and how responsive should the system be? Questions like these have been the 
subject of a lot of thought and experience in the political realm; that work can 
help us think about the structure of governance within the corporation. 
 
 
                                                          
GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION (1978); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 
469, 469-73 (1987); Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2493 
(2005). 
284 Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy, 
63 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1397-1404 (2006). 
285 FEDERALIST TEN, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE 
FEDERALIST PAPERS 43 (Gary Wills, ed. 1982) (defining faction as “a number of 
citizens amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated 
by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other 
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community”). 
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1.  Interested Parties  
Systems that aggregate preferences typically limit input to people who have 
a stake or interest in the enterprise.286 When possible, the degree of input should 
be calibrated with the weight of that interest, or the strength of those 
preferences.287 We aggregate the preferences of interested parties to ensure more 
thoughtful decisionmaking and lend a measure of legitimacy to electoral 
outcomes.288 And, indeed, most discussions of governance systems—corporate 
and political—take it for granted that input should be limited to those with an 
interest in the enterprise.289 After that, though, the disagreements start almost 
immediately. They resolve into a couple different issues. First, who has interests 
that are sufficiently substantial to merit some kind of input into the future of the 
enterprise? Second, how are those interests best captured: through mutual 
agreement, voting, or some mixture of the two?290 
The modern corporate structure dictates that the shareholders have their 
preferences captured through voting—primarily by voting on boards of 
directors, but also, in some cases like mergers or dissolutions, more directly—
and all other constituents, from employees to suppliers to customers, have their 
preferences captured largely through individual agreements.291 From the 
perspective of preference aggregation, voting is used to capture an ongoing set 
of preferences that are then translated into a system of governance for the firm. 
As an institutional entity, it needs a process whereby it can make decisions, 
effectuate actions, and carry on business. The shareholders have been designated 
as the body politic whose preferences are collated through various voting 
procedures. 
The basic corporate stakeholders—those with an interest in firm 
decisionmaking—are fairly well known. Employees, shareholders, suppliers, 
customers, contractors, and even the community at large all have interests in the 
operation of a typical corporation.292 The nature of their interests, of course, may 
                                                          
286 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 452-56; Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise 
of One Person, One Vote, 102 MICH. L. REV. 213, 251-61 (2003); Melvyn R. Durchslag, 
Salyer, Ball, and Hold: Reappraising the Right to Vote in Terms of Political “Interest” 
and Vote Dilution, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV 1, 38-39 (1982). 
287 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 456-58; Hayden, supra note 286, at 248. 
288 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 453. 
289 See id. at 452-60, 463-64. 
290 These two questions are not unrelated, but in order to think through some of the 
issues here, we think it helps to keep them separated. 
291 See infra, notes 54-56, and accompanying text. 
292 See infra, notes 38-42, and accompanying text. 
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vary tremendously between groups and, as we’ve seen before, even within 
groups.293 This is true both with respect to the content of their preferences (what 
they care about) and the strength of the preferences (how much they care). With 
few exceptions, both democratic and economic theorists take the contents of 
preferences as they come. In politics, for example, we don’t prevent people from 
voting because of whom they support or what they believe.294 Standard 
economics treats preferences much the same way, or, if anything, elevates them 
to an even more exalted position. Revealed preference theory holds that the best 
way to tell what consumers want is to observe their purchasing decisions.295 
Economists do not typically claim that consumers didn’t (or shouldn’t) really 
want something—they just register existing preferences and build their theories 
accordingly.  
The strength of constituent interests is a different matter. While we don’t 
tell citizens or consumers what to care about, we do make basic decisions about 
the structure of governance based on how much we think they care, how much 
they have at stake in the outcome of government or firm decisionmaking. 
Ideally, in both polities and corporations, we figure out who has strong interests 
in the enterprise and assign them the right to vote—a voice in the governance 
process.296 Those with a sufficient level of interest vote; those with even more 
interest may get some type of additional weight added to their vote.297 We 
believe that those with strong preferences about a matter are the ones who 
deserve to have their preferences aggregated.  
Though it makes sense as an initial matter to tie voting to preference 
strength, we immediately run into a problem: we do not have a foolproof way to 
measure the strength of anybody’s preferences.298 We could, of course, just ask 
people how strongly they felt about an election outcome. But, with voting or, 
more generally, governance, tied to interest, people would have an incentive to 
                                                          
293 See infra, notes 77-80, and accompanying text. 
294 For example, this is the intuition that underpins Kenneth Arrow’s condition of 
democratic fairness typically referred to as universal admissibility. See Grant M. 
Hayden, Some Implications of Arrow’s Theorem for Voting Rights, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
295, 298 (1995); see also WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A 
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF 
SOCIAL CHOICE 217 (1982). 
295 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 NW. U. 
L. REV. 4, 4-6 (1994). 
296 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 452-60, 463-64. 
297 See id. at 456-58; Hayden, supra note 286, at 248. 
298 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 453-54. 
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strategically misrepresent the strength of their preferences.299 And even if we 
had accurate reports from people about how strong their interests were in an 
election, we lack a method of neutrally comparing those reports to those of 
others who report having an interest.300 There is no universal scale upon which 
to measure people’s preference strength; no way, in other words, to carry out 
interpersonal utility comparisons in a completely objective manner.301  
For these and other reasons, our political system has not generally relied 
upon first-person reports to assess preference strength and, thus, the right to 
participate. Instead, it has relied upon other proxies, or markers, for a person’s 
interest in the outcome of an election.302 Throughout our history, states have 
relied on a wide variety of such markers, such as property-holding, taxpaying, 
or residency.303 Ultimately, the decision is this: whether the person, based on 
certain factors relative to their person, should have the right to participate in 
governance. 
 
2. Marking Interest 
The search for a good marker for voter interest boils down to coming up 
with an indicator of voter interest that is both accurate and manageable.304 The 
accuracy of a marker is a measure of how well it picks out the group of people 
who have a sufficient interest in the outcome of an election.305 A marker could 
be off by either including too many people who lack a sufficient interest or 
excluding people who have a strong interest; in other words, it could be 
overinclusive or underinclusive.306 With an overinclusive marker, we risk 
extending the franchise to those with a weak or nonexistent interest in the 
                                                          
299 See id. at 453-54. 
300 See id. 
301 For a summary of the problem of making interpersonal utility comparisons, see 
Hayden, supra note 294, at 236-47. For more general background in the area, see 
INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 
1991); JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL 
IMPORTANCE 113-20 (1986); Peter Hammond, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: 
Why and How They Are and Should Be Made, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF 
WELL-BEING 200, 238-254 (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991). 
302 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 454. 
303 See id. at 454-56; Hayden, supra note 286, at 255-59.  
304 For an extended discussion of this, see Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 460-62. 
305 See id. at 460. 
306 See id. 
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election, thus diluting the votes of those with a stronger interest.307 An 
underinclusive marker is even worse—it leads to outright disenfranchisement of 
those with a real stake in the outcome.308 When it comes to assigning weight to 
votes, the accuracy of the marker depends on whether and how well it can be 
calibrated to the strength of voter preferences.309 
Of course, we have no direct way of assessing the accuracy of any marker 
because, as mentioned above, we have no direct way of measuring and 
comparing preference strength to begin with. Instead, as in any other situation, 
we have to made education guesses about how much various people are affected 
by the decisionmaking of a particular elected body and make an assumption that 
the people more strongly affected will be those with stronger electoral 
preferences. These judgments about the strength of people’s interest may be 
contested, but they are essential to get any voting system up and running. 
We make these kinds of judgments all the time in the political arena. The 
early freehold requirements, for example, were an attempt to capture one’s stake 
in an election, and they were fine as far as they went (that is, those with a large 
amount of property did have an interest in elections), but they were 
underinclusive, disenfranchising large numbers of property-less people who 
were, nonetheless, also greatly affected by the exercise of governmental 
powers.310 More contemporary requirements, such as residency and citizenship, 
seem like better (though still imperfect) markers of voter interest. For example, 
those who are residents within the jurisdiction of a particular government are 
subject to its police powers, taxation, and services, and thus have quite a bit at 
stake in an election.311 Residency isn’t perfect, of course. It’s a little 
underinclusive, in that it fails to capture those who work or own property in one 
place and reside in another.312 At times, it can also be overinclusive, as when it 
allows people to vote who plan to move out of town right after election day.313 
But despite debates around the margins, most agree that residency is a more 
accurate marker for voter interest than, say, owning property.314 And, in the 
United States, when state and local governments tinker too much and try to use 
                                                          
307 See id. 
308 See id. Of course, we could stitch together more than one underinclusive marker and 
better capture voter interest. 
309 See id. 
310 See id. at 461. 
311 See id.  
312 See id. 
313 See id. 
314 See id. 
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markers that are too overinclusive or underinclusive, they are often disallowed 
from doing so for that very reason. New York, for example, attempted to limit 
voting in certain school district elections to people who either had school-aged 
children or owned or leased taxable property in the district.315 The U.S. Supreme 
Court acknowledged that voting may be tied to interest, but struck these 
particular markers as both overinclusive and underinclusive,316 explaining, that 
“[s]tatutes granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose 
the danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental 
affairs which substantially affect their lives.”317  
Of course, we could always come up with some more extensive survey of 
voter interest to get a better fix on whether any particular person has a strong 
interest in the outcome of an election.318 For example, perhaps a survey reveals 
that while both Luke and Ben are residents of a certain town, Ben plans to move 
away in just a few weeks. A third potential voter, Milo, lives nearby, but works 
and owns property in town, including the house where his elderly, dependent 
mother lives. With such information, we might conclude that, while residency is 
a good starting point, our additional information reveals that, really, Luke and 
Milo have sufficient interest in the jurisdiction to vote, and Ben, despite his 
current residency, does not. But this kind of individualized preference 
information would be incredibly costly to obtain, much less keep up to date. 
And, of course, if we obtain this information by asking everyone about their 
interests, we’d worry about strategic misrepresentation.319 But, in any case, an 
ongoing process of surveying everyone about their potential interests in every 
jurisdiction is simply unworkable, which brings us to the second feature of any 
good marker: its manageability.320 
Democratic institutions have long valued markers for voter interest that are 
easily managed. The property-holding and taxpaying requirements of old were 
not only useful because they ensured that voters had a financial stake in election 
outcomes, they did so with information that was readily available to the state. In 
fact, the state and local governments that ran the elections usually had lists of 
both property holders and taxpayers, which made it very easy to administer the 
voter rolls.321 Residency has been a little harder to pin down—state and local 
                                                          
315 See Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
316 Id. at 632 n.15. 
317 Id. at 626-27. 
318 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 462. 
319 See id. 
320 See id. at 461. 
321 See id. 
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governments do not, usually, have ready lists of all of their residents—so 
residency is often confirmed by requesting some sort of identification with a 
name and address on it (a utility bill, for example); if one’s residency is 
questioned, it is ultimately something that can be easily confirmed. 
Manageability, then, is a key feature of any marker used to pick out a potential 
voter’s interest in the outcome of an election. 
 
B. Who Should Vote? 
  Developing a method of aggregating individual preferences, then, demands 
that we first figure out whose preferences to aggregate. This typically involves 
finding some way to measure the level of interest that a potential voter has in the 
outcome of an election. Because we do not have direct. reliable access to that 
kind of information, we usually depend upon some sort of marker for that 
interest. And not all preferences are expressed through markers. We generally 
divide the electorate into those whose preferences can be expressed through 
voting, and those who preferences cannot. Until now, corporate governance has 
allowed only shareholders to express their preferences through votes. But it is 
time to reexamine this reality.  
As detailed earlier, the longstanding theory of the firm counsels that two 
groups of constituents—shareholders and employees—have a special 
relationship to the corporation that militates in favor of assigning voting rights 
to them. In this part, we argue that core features of democratic theory—the tie 
between voting and interest and the accompanying need for markers of that 
interest—point in the same direction. Here, too, there are features of 
shareholders and employees that allow us to distinguish them from other 
stakeholders. Most simply, their relationship with the firm gives them the 
accurate and manageable markers of interest that other corporate constituents, 
in ordinary business situations, lack.  
 
1.  Shareholders 
For shareholders, the value of the capital contribution and the percentage of 
the dividend interest provide fairly quantifiable measures of the shareholder’s 
interest in the corporation. Putting aside any outside interests of the shareholder, 
the allocation of one vote for each share accurately correlates to the 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441307 
 
 
 
66                                                      Law Review                                             [Vol. 100 
 
shareholder’s financial interest in the corporation.322 The system of one share, 
one vote calibrates the level of interest with the level of input. Shareholding, in 
other words, appears to be both an accurate and manageable marker of interest 
in a corporation, and thus shareholders should be accorded voting rights. 
However, the familiarity of this conclusion belies the complicating factors 
to this democratic argument for shareholder voting. Although shares are 
originally sold for the same price during the initial public offering, publicly-
traded shares soon enter the marketplace, where their values may change 
drastically over time. One shareholder may have purchased Facebook shares for 
$30 in 2012, while recent shareholders may have paid over $200.323 Although 
everyone’s shares may have the same value at any given moment in time, 
individual shareholders have likely invested different amounts per share to 
obtain those shares (and votes). 
Shareholders also have differing interests outside the firm. Those interests 
may swamp the shareholder’s interest in the corporation’s residual. Shareholders 
may tailor their financial holdings to match shareholder voting power with 
counterveiling interests in derivatives or short positions.324 They may have 
personal interests, such as family ties325 or religious and political values,326 that 
conflict with the principle of shareholder wealth maximization. The 
shareholders themselves may be social investing funds327 or sovereign wealth 
                                                          
322 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 72 (“The most basic statutory voting 
rule is the same in every state. It is this: all common shares vote, all votes have the same 
weights, and no other participant in the venture votes, unless there is some agreement 
to the contrary. Such agreements are rare.”). 
323 Cf. Matt Phillips, Facebook’s Stock Plunge Shatters Faith in Tech Companies’ 
Invincibility, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/business/facebook-stock-earnings-call.html. 
324 See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and 
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 816 (2006); Shaun Martin & 
Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 780 (2005) (discussing 
“economically encumbered” and “legally encumbered” shares). 
325 Benjamin Means, Nonmarket Values in Family Businesses, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1185 (2013). 
326 See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 733 (2005). 
327 See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, The Law and Economics of 
Environmental, Social, and Governance Investing by a Fiduciary, Working Paper, Sept. 
5, 2018, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3244665.  
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funds328 or an algorithm.329 Pension funds may want to promote worker power, 
while hedge funds may want to make a quick sale after juicing up the price. 
Shareholders do not have “pure” interests as shareholders, no more than citizens 
have “pure” interests in the republic.  
There is also an accuracy issue when it comes to measuring shareholder 
preferences in that it may not be worth the shareholder’s time and investment to 
correlate the vote in question accurately with the shareholder’s preferences. The 
shareholder interest for those holding only a few shares is rather weak. The move 
to passive index funds further removes the shareholder’s interests from any 
effort to express those interests through a vote.330 Fully diversified shareholders 
are close to indifferent to the fortunes of any particular corporation.  
There are also underappreciated difficulties in the manageability of 
shareholder voting. Shareholder governance is still centered around the idea of 
the annual shareholders meeting, which shareholders in theory are expected to 
attend.331 If unable to attend, shareholders designate their voting power to 
proxies, who then act on their behalf. Shareholders receive proxy ballots from 
the incumbent board, which makes the process much easier while subverting its 
democratic nature. Add to this the fact that modern shareholding is generally 
managed through intermediaries who hold the shares on behalf of the actual 
owner.332 Confusion over voting rights can abound in the context of custodial 
ownership, short sales, lending shares, and changes in ownership after the record 
                                                          
328 See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate 
Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345 
(2008). 
329 See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 680 (2013). 
330 See Lund, supra note 6, at 497 (proposing that lawmakers should restrict truly 
passive funds from voting at shareholder meetings because of their lack of interests in 
voting). 
331 William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Case Against Mandatory Annual Director Elections 
and Shareholders' Meetings, 74 TENN. L. REV. 199, 201 (2007) (discussing the 
“mandatory requirement under state corporate law and stock exchange listing standards 
that public corporations hold annual shareholders' meetings for the election of 
director”). 
332 Hon. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections 
on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in A More Rational System of Corporate 
Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 6–7 (2007) (discussing the “separation of ownership from 
ownership,” namely that “the equity of public corporations is often owned, not by the 
end-user investors, but by another form of agency, a mutual fund, or other institutional 
investor”). 
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date.333 Trading shares is also accomplished through lightning-fast technology, 
and the allocation of particular shares to particular holders has not caught up 
with this technology.334 Although certain reforms may address particular 
uncertainties over voting rights for particular shares,335 there remain difficulties 
in matching up particular shareholders with voting rights in a particular election. 
But despite these concerns, shareholders have sufficiently defined interests 
to provide accurate and manageable markers for their voting rights. They have 
a clear stake in the outcome of decisionmaking. They have a straightforward 
way to calibrate the strength of their interest. And because shareholders provide 
unencumbered capital to the corporation in exchange for certain rights to the 
residual profits, they cannot register their preferences meaningfully through 
agreement alone; they need a governance mechanism. Shareholder voting rights 
are designed to manage those preferences.  
 
2. Employees 
Employment is also an accurate and manageable marker of interest in the 
success of a corporation. Employees have an interest in the value of the 
corporation as expressed through their continued employment. A worker 
contributes to the process of joint production through her labor and creates both 
specific value (creation of a particular good or service) and longer-term 
indefinite value (the value of the ongoing business as expressed through good 
will, trademark, and share price). Employees receive wages and benefits and 
may, in some cases, participate as shareholders through a 401(k) plan. But they 
also have an interest in the ongoing business of the company simply by virtue of 
having a job. This job renders them participants in the ongoing production and 
entitles them to have a voice in the joint production process through the 
governance of the firm. 
As compared with shareholders, it is both easier and more difficult to 
correlate employment interests with a schema of voting rights within the firm. 
Employees are smaller in number, easier to keep track of, and have an 
                                                          
333 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. 
L.J. 1227, 1231 (2008) (“The inescapable complexity combined with the already well-
studied issues of shareholders' rational apathy and free rider problems detract from the 
case for shareholder voting.”). 
334 George Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 227, 228-
29 (2019) (noting the failure to connect particular shares with their owners in the context 
of electronic trading). 
335 Id. 
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attachment to the firm that makes the logistics of election participation easier to 
manage. At the same time, there are more factors that could complicate the 
assignment of particular voting interests to employees. First, the category of 
employment is less clearly defined than the category of shareholder. The test for 
“employment” has traditionally been the common-law control test, which asks 
whether the employer has the right to control the action of the employee within 
the scope of employment.336 The test has uncertain boundaries and can result in 
uncertainty over whether a particular worker is an employee or an independent 
contractor.337 At the same time, however, corporations officially designate their 
employees for tax purposes and withhold employee income taxes.338 This tax 
designation would be a fairly straightforward way to delineate employees, and 
workers could contest that designation if they felt improperly excluded from the 
employment rolls. 
Corporations may also struggle over the specific voting rights to be granted 
to each employee. The easiest system to administer would allocate one set of 
voting rights to each employee. But employees might object to this allocation 
along a variety of lines, arguing instead that employees with more seniority, 
higher wages, more hours, or greater stature within the company deserve greater 
voting rights. Unlike a unit of shares, a unit of “employment” is not the same for 
each employee in terms of interest in the firm. The conflict over the allocation 
                                                          
336 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1958) (defining a 
servant/employee as: “a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another 
and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is 
subject to the other's control or right to control”). 
337 Id. § 220 cmt. c (noting that the employment relationship is “one not capable of exact 
definition”); Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 661, 682–83 (2013) (“Courts and commentators continue to bemoan [the 
control test’s] inability to deliver clear answers.”). 
338 Firms are expected to differentiate between employees and independent contractors 
over a host of provisions, including whether taxes need to be withheld, 26 U.S.C. §§ 
3401(c), 3402 (2018), whether the firm must pay a share of Social Security and 
Medicare (FICA), id. §§ 3101, 3121(d), and unemployment (FUTA) taxes, id. §§ 3301, 
3306(i), for the worker, and whether the workers count as employees for benefit plan 
purposes. Id. § 410(a). The IRS defines employees based on the common law control 
test. Id. § 3121(d)(2) (defining an employee as, among other definitions, “any individual 
who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-
employee relationship, has the status of an employee”).  
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of employee voting rights is one reason why commentators have argued against 
them.339  
But this disparity between shareholders and employees can also be 
overstated. As discussed above, shareholder voting rights are not always 
allocated along the lines of “one share, one vote.” Many of the largest and most 
prominent companies—Google, Facebook, Viacom—have allocated voting 
rights disproportionately amongst shareholder groups to give a group of 
founders, family members, or insiders more power relative to their fellow 
stockholders. These companies made this choice based on competing interests 
in providing more governance to a select group based on that group’s role within 
the firm.340 Similar analyses could apply in the employee voting rights context: 
the company could design a system of voting rights based on the relative 
importance of employee voice to the company.341 For now, corporations would 
face the choice of a straightforward allocation of employee voting rights—one 
employee, one vote—or decide to assign voting rights based on a more nuanced 
analysis of employee interests. 
One other structural concern with adding employee voting rights into the 
corporate governance mix is their potential incommensurability with 
shareholder voting rights. If we have one share, one vote on one side, and one 
employee, one vote on the other, how will we match up these two systems? How 
many shares’ worth of votes will one employee have? But matching up two sets 
of voters is by no means impossible, and it’s certainly not a reason to shut out a 
group of otherwise qualified constituents out of board elections.  
When it comes to allocating voting power between shareholders and 
employees, we imagine that most corporations would want to take one of two 
approaches. The first would provide for separate systems of voting rights in 
which there would be no need to measure commensurability. So, for example, 
shareholders would vote for a set of shareholder directors, and employee would 
vote for a set of employee directors. The voting rights would not need to be 
commensurable as they would be participating in different elections. Both the 
                                                          
339 HANSMANN, supra note 87; Henry Hansmann, Employee Ownership and Unions: 
Lessons from the Airline Industry, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE EMERGING 
WORKPLACE: ALTERNATIVES/SUPPLEMENTS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 573-80 
(Samuel Estreicher, ed., Kluwer Law International, 1998). 
340 See Lund, supra note 8 (discussing the benefits of a disproportionate voting 
structure). 
341 Recent innovations in employee participatory governance structures include 
holacracy and other participatory (or “evolutionary”) management structures. See 
LALOUX, supra note 13; ROBERTSON, supra note 13. 
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German system of codetermination342 and bills recently introduced in the U.S. 
Senate track this approach.343 
The second possible system would combine shareholders and employees 
into a single electorate. The corporation would then have to make a judgment 
about how to weight the votes of individual shareholders and employees. 
Corporations following this approach would probably start with a judgement 
about the general allocation of voting power between shareholders and 
employees, and then translate that into individual voting weights. So, for 
example, a corporation could decide that employees should have roughly forty 
percent344 of the voting rights within the corporation, and then allocate votes 
between the two groups based on this rough proportion.345 
At this stage, it’s enough to say that the logistical challenges are not 
insurmountable. More importantly, they do not justify the exclusion of a set of 
corporate participants from participation in governance. Employees are 
participants in the firm and contribute their efforts to the process of joint 
production. They should not be excluded from governance simply because we 
currently have systems in place that find it easier to exclude them. 
 
3. Other Corporate Constituents 
The theory of the firm and democratic participation theory both counsel in 
favor of extending the corporate franchise to shareholders and employees. Those 
two groups deserve voting rights because they are within the economic firm—
they participate in a process of joint production as carried on by the firm. They 
also have the accurate and manageable markers of interest that allow for the 
creation of a workable system of corporate governance. The same, however, 
cannot be said of other corporate constituents. 
                                                          
342 Andreas Rühmkorf, Company law and corporate governance in Germany: From 
stakeholder value to corporate sustainability?, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF 
CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY (Beate Sjåfell & 
Christopher Bruner eds., forthcoming 2019); Ewan McGaughey, The Codetermination 
Bargains: The History of German Corporate and Labor Law, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 
135, 136 (2016). 
343 Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018); Reward Work Act, S. 
2605, 115th Cong. (2018). 
344 Cf. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018) (assigning employees 
with voting rights to 40% of the board). 
345 One problem with this type of system is that if one group or the other has a majority 
of the votes, they can completely dictate the outcomes of winner-take-all elections. 
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Along with the theory of the firm, democratic participation theory provides 
a second means of separating the insiders—shareholders and employees—from 
other constituents outside the corporation. With most firms, it doesn’t make 
sense to capture the preferences of customers, suppliers, and other constituencies 
though the franchise. This is both because their interest in the success of the firm 
are not as significant as those of the insiders and because their status and 
relationship with the firm do not provide particularly accurate or manageable 
markers of that interest. For those reasons, participation theory generally 
counsels against extending the franchise to these outside stakeholders. 
Take, for example, the customers of a large corporation. Customers 
certainly have some relationship with a firm such that they have a stake in, and 
preferences regarding, its success. But their interest in the continued success of 
the company is more tenuous, and their ongoing contacts with the company, 
even assuming the planned obsolescence of the latest product, are likely to be 
relatively sporadic. Their status as customers is not a particularly strong marker 
for interest in the future success of the firm. It’s also not a particularly 
manageable marker, given that the company’s interaction with the person may 
be limited to the point of sale, if that; after that, tracking the customers becomes 
more difficult. The same may be said of a corporation’s suppliers, though the 
relationship may be a little closer there, and the markers a little more 
manageable.  
  Of course, there may be certain types of customers who enjoy a continuous 
and significant relationship with a corporation such that they have a more 
significant interest and it’s more manageable to identify them for the purpose of 
extending the franchise. Some utility customers, for example, have that kind of 
relationship with their providers.346 And in those situations, democratic 
participation theory would counsel in favor of extending them voting rights.  
Democratic participation theory is certainly flexible enough to deal with 
unique customer bases and the possible rise of accurate and manageable markers 
of constituent interest, and assign voting rights accordingly. For now, though, in 
the regular course of corporate governance, it militates in favor of extending 
voting rights to shareholders and employees and leaving the interests of other 
constituents to contract or government regulation.    
  
                                                          
346 HANSMANN, supra note 87 (discussing how rural electrical cooperatives involve 
ownership by customers); Yosifon, Lock-In, supra note 229 (arguing that consumers 
may have ongoing interests through lock-in purchases). 
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C.  The German Experience 
Shareholder primacy is so entrenched in American corporate law and 
scholarship that it sometimes seems difficult to imagine any other way of 
thinking about the corporation. This lack of imagination may help explain why 
arguments for the exclusive shareholder franchise—recently exposed as being 
quite deficient—continue to plod along in the background of an awful lot of 
corporate governance scholarship. It has certainly kept many legal scholars from 
seriously considering alternative models. There are, however, good examples of 
such models, some of which have been around for a century. What’s more: they 
specifically involve employee representation on corporate boards. 
While the United States itself has some history of employee involvement in 
corporate governance, it’s pretty thin gruel.347 The oldest codetermination law 
still in force is a 1919 Massachusetts statute that expressly allows a corporation 
to have employee representatives on its board.348 That law, however, is 
permissive, and there’s not much evidence that corporations in that state have 
made use of the option. Union members actually served on the boards of several 
large corporations in the 1980s and 1990s, including United Airlines, PanAm, 
and Chrysler.349 And, more recently, several bills have been proposed in 
Congress that would require employee representation on corporate boards.350 
But the American experience with employee board representation has been 
isolated, sporadic, and often aspirational.   
Europe, though, is another story. Many European countries give employees 
some degree of access to corporate boards.351  But the German system of 
codetermination offers the most robust protection of employee representation on 
corporate boards.  German codetermination has also been in place for decades 
                                                          
347 For a good, comprehensive rundown of this, see Ewan McGaughey, Democracy in 
America at Work: The History of Labor’s Vote in Corporate Governance, 42 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 697 (2019). 
348 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156, § 23 (2018); see McGaughey, supra note 347, at 718.  
349 See McGaughey, supra note 347, at 736-37. 
350 See, e.g., ACCOUNTABLE CAPITALISM ACT, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 6 (2018) 
(requiring 40% of boards in large companies be elected by employees); REWARD WORK 
ACT, S. 2605, 115th Cong. § 3(c)(2) (2018) (requiring one-third of listed board to be 
elected by employees); H.R. 6096, 115th Cong. § 3(c)(2) (2018) (same); see also 
McGaughey, supra note 347, at 698-99. 
351 For a recent list of countries, see Ewan McGaughey, Votes at Work in Britain: 
Shareholder Monopolisation and the “Single Channel”, 47 INDUS. L.J. 76, 79-80, 79 
n.17, & 80 fig.1 (2018). 
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as part of a large, modern economy, making it the obvious exemplar of such a 
system. So it is to this German system that we now turn. 
Codetermination actually describes two very different features of German 
corporations.352 “Social codetermination” involves employee representation on 
shop-level works councils at all companies with at least five employees.353  The 
works councils have a broad range of rights in the workplace, ranging from the 
right to receive economic and financial information to the right of consultation 
on matters relating to the organization and structure of jobs to the power to 
negotiate work agreements.354  “Supervisory codetermination,” on the other 
hand, describes employee representation at the level of the corporate board,355 
and is thus of greater interest here.  
Supervisory codetermination laws dictate the composition of the boards of 
directors for large German companies.356 Unlike the United States, Germany 
uses a two-tiered corporate board structure.357 The supervisory board provides 
more general oversight of the company and appoints the members of the 
management board.358 The management board runs the company, directing 
resources and making the day-to-day business decisions.359 Management boards 
                                                          
352 Here we are using the terminology from Otto Sandrock & Jean J. du Plessis, The 
German System of Supervisory Codetermination by Employees, in GERMAN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT 167, 169 
(Jean J. du Plessis et al., eds., 3d ed. 2017). 
353 See id. at 169-71. 
354 See JOHN T. ADDISON, THE ECONOMICS OF CODETERMINATION: LESSONS FROM 
THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE 16-19 (2009). 
355 See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 352, at 169. 
356 See id. at 172-78.  
357 See Jean J. du Plessis et. al, An Overview of German Business or Enterprise Law and 
the One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Systems Contrasted, in GERMAN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT 1, 8-13 (Jean J. du Plessis 
et al., eds., 3d ed. 2017). 
358 See Jean J. du Plessis & Otto Saenger, The Supervisory Board as Company Organ, 
in GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT 
105, 133-53 (Jean J. du Plessis et al., eds., 3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter du Plessis & 
Saenger, Supervisory Board]; Jean J. du Plessis & Otto Saenger, The General Meeting 
and the Management Board as Company Organs, in GERMAN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT 63, 73 (Jean J. du Plessis 
et al., eds., 3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter du Plessis & Saenger, General Meeting]. 
359 Generally speaking, the two-tiered boards are probably better at supervising top 
employees because there are fewer of the conflicts of interest that occur when managers 
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of larger companies also have a personnel director responsible for “all matters 
relating to labor and social relations.”360 Though this two-tiered board structure 
of German corporations is not shared by their American counterparts, there is no 
reason to think that their system of supervisory codetermination would not work 
with unitary boards.361 
The degree of supervisory codetermination on German corporate boards 
depends on the type of industry, the number of employees, and a few other 
factors.362 Corporations with fewer than 500 employees have supervisory board 
members elected by shareholders; corporations with 500 to 2000 employees 
typically have one-third of their board members elected by employees (called, 
unsurprisingly, one-third board parity); and those with more than 2000 
employees have one-half of their supervisory board members elected by 
employees.363  In most of these large companies with one-half codetermination, 
employees enjoy “quasi-parity” because the shareholders elect the chair (and 
potential tiebreaker vote).  In the coal, iron, and steel industries, however, there 
is a neutral chair (and tiebreaker), giving the employees “full parity,” or a truly 
shared system of governance.364 Thus, in Germany, we have a longstanding 
example of shared corporate governance, with shareholder and employee 
representatives working side by side on the supervisory boards of major 
companies.  
                                                          
are on the corporate board; without those managers, though, information may flow to 
the supervisory board more sluggishly. 
360 Depending on the level of codetermination (discussed below) the personnel director 
has the support of the employee representatives of the supervisory board.  For full-parity 
codetermination governed by the 1952 law, employee representative have veto power 
over the appointment of the personnel director; for companies with quasi-parity 
codetermination, personnel directors are usually not appointed unless they enjoy the 
support of the employee representatives.  See Otto Sandrock, German and International 
Perspectives of the German Model of Codetermination, 26 EURO. BUS. L. REV. 129, 
131-32 (2015). 
361 See Tom C. Hodge, The Treatment of Employees as Stakeholders in the European 
Union: Current and Future Trends, 38 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L & COM. 91, 116 (2010). 
362 See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 352, at 182-83. 
363 See Jean J. du Plessis & Ingo Saenger, An Overview of the Corporate Governance 
Debate in Germany, in GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
EUROPEAN CONTEXT 17, 48-49 (Jean J. du Plessis et al., eds., 3d ed. 2017); Sandrock 
& du Plessis, supra note 352, at 173-78; ADDISON, supra note 354, at 103; Sandrock, 
supra note 360, at 131-32.  
364 See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 352, at 173-76.  This is true of companies in 
these sectors at a lower threshold—1000 instead of 2000 employees. 
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So what have corporate law scholars done with this alternative version of 
corporate governance, one that actually exists in flesh and blood German 
supervisory boards? For decades, codetermination has received little more than 
passing attention from corporate governance scholars. It is rarely given the kind 
of in-depth treatment that a fully functioning, alternative model of corporate 
governance would seem to demand.365 
Codetermination shows up most often in a variant of the contractarian 
argument for the exclusive shareholder franchise.  This version of the argument 
is as follows. If codetermination is so great, then firms should voluntarily adopt 
it. But firms have not done so.  Codetermination, therefore, is not that great and, 
in fact, is less efficient than the method of governance chosen in the U.S., with 
corporate boards elected by shareholders alone. In fact, the only way a firm 
would end up with employee representation on its board is if you force it to do 
so, as Germany does by law. Nobody freely chooses codetermination; it is less 
efficient than corporate governance structures in which shareholders run the 
show. 
A number of legal scholars—including George Dent,366 Henry Hansmann 
and Renier Kraakman,367 and Roberta Romano368—have argued that 
codetermination must be inefficient because it has not been voluntarily adopted 
by firms.369 But the argument may have been first (and in any case, most 
forcefully) made by Michael Jensen and William Meckling in the late 1970s.370   
                                                          
365 One refreshing exception is EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163-235 
(Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999). 
366 See George W. Dent, Jr., Stakeholder Governance: A Bad Idea Getting Worse, 58 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1107, 1115 (2008). 
367 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 445 (“The growing view today is that 
meaningful direct worker voting participation in corporate affairs tends to produce 
inefficient decisions, paralysis, or weak boards, and that these costs are likely to exceed 
any potential benefits that worker participation might bring.”); Luca Enriques, Henry 
Hansmann, Renier Kraakman & Mariana Pargendler, The Basic Governance Structure: 
Minority Shareholders and Non-Shareholder Constituencies, in THE ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 79, 106 (John 
Armour et al., eds., 3d ed. 2017). 
368 See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 129-30 
(1993). 
369 This argument in broader theoretical context is also discussed in ADDISON, supra 
note 354, at 104-08. 
370 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: 
An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. BUS. 469, 473-
75, 503-04 (1979). 
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“Without fiat,” they claimed, “codetermination would be virtually 
nonexistent.”371 They then backed up this argument with a prediction: German 
codetermination would soon devolve into a system in which either shareholders 
or employees has complete control.372 If the former, then codetermination would 
just go away, and be replaced by the shareholder control that dominates the 
landscape in the United States.373  If, however, employees succeed in controlling 
firms, then the Germany economy would grind to a halt like Tito’s Yugoslavia, 
with “fairly complete, if not total, state ownership of the productive assets in the 
economy.”374 
Some forty years later, Jensen and Meckling’s prediction looks laughable. 
German codetermination remains in place and, as we shall soon see, is an 
important aspect of its robust economy.375 More broadly, though, the key 
assumption underlying the argument—that codetermination can only arise 
through fiat, not voluntary agreement—has itself been revealed to be false. Ewan 
McGaughey, a legal historian and economist, recently showed that German 
codetermination first arose through collective agreements, and only later was 
enacted into law.376 Codetermination arrived at the end of World War I, “not as 
a law, not as a regulation, but as an agreement.”377 Only afterward did 
supervisory codetermination get codified into legislation.378  Codetermination 
was then abolished by the Nazi Regime with a 1934 statute,379 only to be 
recreated—again though consensual agreement—at the conclusion of World 
War II.380 The basic sequence was that codetermination arose through 
consensual agreement, developed into social consensus, and later became 
embodied in the law.381 This history shows that the law and economics scholars 
are not just wrong on this point, but may have the picture completely upside 
down: codetermination was created by agreement not once but twice, while the 
law was sometimes used to quash it.382 
                                                          
371 Id. at 473. 
372 See id. at 503. 
373 See id. 
374 Id. at 504. 
375 See infra notes 389-410 and accompanying text. 
376 See McGaughey, supra note 342. 
377 Id. at 155. 
378 See id. at 157. 
379 See id. at 162. 
380 See id. at 163-67. 
381 See id. at 174. 
382 See id. at 170. 
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So if codetermination arose through voluntary agreement in Germany, why 
didn’t the same bargain get struck everywhere else?  What was so special about 
Germany?  McGaughey identifies two, relatively rare “Goldilocks” conditions 
that existed in postwar Germany: first, employers and employees had relatively 
equal bargaining power, and, second, the labor movement was unified around a 
common objective of securing meaningful representation at work.383  These two 
conditions made the codetermination bargain possible. 
Now, it might be argued that the historical rarity of these Goldilocks 
conditions makes the German example unique, ingermane to the more typical 
bargains struck by labor and capital. But a closer look at those conditions shows 
that, if anything, the opposite is true. Remember, the contractarian argument 
draws its normative force from the assumption that freely bargained for 
agreements better reflect the preferences of the parties.384 But in order for this to 
work, the parties must actually be free to bargain. That freedom may be limited 
if the parties are in unequal bargaining positions (making it less likely that the 
weaker party is really getting what it wants), or one group of constituents has 
coordination problems (again, reducing their bargaining power), or there are 
legal or logistical roadblocks to certain kinds of agreements. The contractarian 
argument for the exclusive shareholder franchise fails to account for all three of 
these issues: employees have never had equal bargaining power; labor unions 
have never represented more than one-third of private-sector employees, and 
current represent less than seven percent; and both legal and logistical 
roadblocks make it difficult for unions to participate in corporate governance.385  
There is an additional reason to think that the bargain for employee 
representation may not be struck by individual corporations—namely, the path-
dependency and network effects of the widespread adoption of a particular 
system of governance.  David Levine and Laura Tyson, for example, have 
argued that codetermination needs to be adopted on a broad scale because 
                                                          
383 See id. at 136-37, 155-56, 168. 
384 See notes 63-72, supra, and accompanying text; see also Hayden & Bodie, supra 
note 68, at 531, 533, 541-42. 
385 For discussions of the legal impediments to systems of worker participation, see 
Matthew T. Bodie, Holacracy and the Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 619, 662-71 (2018); 
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Labor Law Obstacles to the Collective Negotiation and 
Implementation of Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Response to Henry Hansmann 
and Other "Survivalists", 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 957 (1998). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441307 
 
 
 
2020]                                RECONSTRUCTING THE CORPORATION                                    79 
 
individual firms find themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma.386 Unilateral adoption 
of codetermination may lead to wage compression (resulting in the loss of 
managerial and executive employees) and dismissal protections (resulting in the 
retention of poorly performing employees), disadvantaging the adopting firm in 
relation to its competitors.387 Without some kind of industry-wide (or economy-
wide) agreement, the constituents of individual firms will rationally fail to adopt 
the approach that would have the greater utility for all concerned.388 The 
industry-wide bargaining that took place in post-war Germany involved exactly 
the kind of cooperation needed to lift corporate players out of this prisoners’ 
dilemma.   
So how well has codetermination worked in Germany? Much of the 
scholarship evaluating the system has centered on its role in promoting broader 
goals such as social cohesion and fairness.389 The bottom-line, economic effects 
of codetermination (which we’ll turn to shortly) are either seen as secondary or 
as necessarily following from the achievement of these societal goals.390 That is, 
codetermination is viewed less in terms of an economic system as one designed 
to promote a well-functioning democracy and help prevent social division—in 
particular, the division between labor and capital. And, on this broad level, it is 
thought to be quite successful. 
The success of codetermination on the social level has carried over to the 
boardroom, where the relationship between labor and capital are relatively 
harmonious.391 Shareholder and employee representatives typically meet 
separately, with the managing board, before the supervisory board meetings.392 
These pre-meetings allow representatives to focus on the interests of their 
constituents and raise concerns with the management boards.393 Recent studies 
have revealed that the supervisory meetings themselves are marked by a great 
                                                          
386 See David I. Levine & Laura D. Tyson, Participation, Productivity, and the Firm’s 
Environment, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY: A LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE 183 (Alan S. 
Blinder, ed. 1990).   
387 See id. at xx. 
388 See id. at xx.  Under the prisoner’s dilemma framework, individual players make 
less-than-optimal choices because of the interdependency of outcomes and the inability 
to trust their partner/opponent. 
389 See ADDISON, supra note 354, at 2. 
390 See id. 
391 See Sandrock, supra note 360, at 131. 
392 See du Plessis & Saenger, supra note 363, at 49. 
393 See id. 
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deal of cooperation between shareholder and employee representatives.394 This 
cooperation may be fostered in part by the legal requirement that shareholder 
and employee representatives must, at that point, put the interest of the 
corporation over those of their respective constituents.395 While the relationships 
at the supervisory board level are not perfect, they are a far cry from the law-
and-economics predictions of firm-destroying voting cycles and other visions of 
inter-board squabbling and disfunction.   
What about firm performance? At this point, there have been a number of 
studies assessing the economic effects of codetermination, with a consensus that 
has shifted back and forth over the last four decades.396 Some early studies from 
the 1980s found that codetermination had very little impact on corporate 
performance.397  Those studies, however, were criticized on a number of 
methodological grounds,398 and several more sophisticated evaluations in the 
1990s and early 2000s gave a more pessimistic account, finding that 
codetermination was associated with, among other things, lower productivity 
and lower profits.399 That consensus, though, soon gave way to a third phase in 
the literature, one that reversed the principal findings of the second-phase studies 
                                                          
394 See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 352, at 186. 
395 See id. at 184; du Plessis & Saenger, General Meeting, supra note 358, at 66. 
396 For the best summary of the literature through 2008 and a discussion of the three 
initial phases of research detailed below, see ADDISON, supra note 354, at 108-121. 
397 See, e.g., Jan Svejnar, Relative Wage Effects of Unions, Dictatorship, and Co-
determination: Econometric Evidence from Germany, 63 REV. ECON. & STATS. 188 
(1981) (finding codetermination associated with higher earnings in the iron and steel 
industry but not in the coal mining industry); Guiseppe Benelli et al., Labor 
Participation in Corporate Policy-Making Decisions: West Germany’s Experience with 
Codetermination, 60 J. BUS. 553 (1987) (finding no real differences between firms with 
codetermination and without codetermination across a variety of measures of 
performance); Michael A. Gurdon & Anoop Rai, Codetermination and Enterprise 
Performance: Empirical Evidence from West Germany, 42 J. ECON. & BUS. 289 (1990) 
(finding codetermination led to higher profitability but lower productivity). 
398 See ADDISON, supra note 354, at 109. 
399 See, e.g., Felix FitzRoy & Kornelius Kraft, Economic Effects of Codetermination, 
95 SCAND. J. ECON. 365 (1993) (finding that the shift to quasi-parity codetermination 
in 1976 had negative effect on productivity); Theodor Baums & Bernd Frick, Co-
determination in Germany: The Impact of Court Decisions on the Market Value of 
Firms, 1 ECON. ANALYSIS 143 (1998) (finding that court rulings that expanded or 
restricted codetermination had no real effect on share price); Gary Gorton & Frank A. 
Schmid, Capital, Labor, and the Firm: A Study of Codetermination, 2 J. EURO. ECON. 
ASS’N 863 (2004) (finding that moving from one-third to quasi-parity codetermination 
negatively affected shareholder wealth). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441307 
 
 
 
2020]                                RECONSTRUCTING THE CORPORATION                                    81 
 
(finding them to be artefacts of a particular method of assessment)400 and finding 
that codetermination was also modestly associated with greater innovation.401 
These more optimistic assessments were bolstered by a couple of modern 
financial studies on the market value of the firm, which found that “prudent” 
levels of employee representation led to better board decisionmaking by 
improving monitoring and thus reducing agency costs.402 This third, rather 
optimistic phase of assessment brought us right up to one of the most profound 
tests of all systems of corporate governance: the global financial crisis. 
The financial crisis did not spare any of the world’s major economies, but 
some recovered more quickly than others. Germany, in particular, recovered 
faster and more thoroughly than many other countries, and did so, at least in part, 
because of its corporate governance model.403 Economic downturns are always 
difficult for companies and their employees.  But codetermination allowed the 
management of many companies “to more easily seek the consent of its 
workforce for carrying out more or less drastic measures.”404  These measures 
included a system (Kurzarbeit) that avoided mass layoffs by temporarily 
reducing the working hours (and salaries) of many of the employees.405 This 
avoided painful layoffs and allowed companies to retain their core workforces, 
which allowed the economy as a whole to avoid the worst of the economic 
slump.406  
In addition, a number of new studies came out during the period of recovery 
that were consistent with the third phase of the literature, showing that 
codetermination generally had positive economic effects. One of the stronger 
results came from a 2019 study by Simon Jager, Benjamin Schoefer, and Jörg 
                                                          
400 See, e.g., Felix FitzRoy & Kornelius Kraft, Co-determination, Efficiency, and 
Productivity, 43 BRIT. J. IND. REL. 233 (2005); see also ADDISON, supra note 354, at 
115-16, 120. 
401 See, e.g., Kornelius Kraft et al., Codetermination and Innovation, Unpublished paper 
(University of Essen); see also ADDISON, supra note 354, at 116. 
402 See Larry Fauver & Michael E. Fuerst, Does Good Corporate Governance Include 
Employee Representation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 
673 (2006); see also Simon Renaud, Dynamic Efficiency of Supervisory Board 
Codetermination in Germany, 21 LABOUR 689 (2007). 
403 See Jean J. du Plessis et al., Preface to GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT, at vii (Jean J. du Plessis et al., eds., 3d ed. 
2017); Sandrock, supra note 360, at 136.  
404 See Sandrock, supra note 360, at 134. 
405 See id.; Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 352, at 188-89, 193. 
406 See Sandrock, supra not 360, at 134; Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 352, at 188-
89, 193. 
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Heining, which showed that shared governance was “associated with an increase 
in capital formation and a shift towards more capital intensive production,” 
probably because it facilitated cooperation between firms and their 
employees.407 
The recent performance of the German economy has begun to change the 
way people view codetermination: the German business community looks at it 
in a more positive light,408 and foreign businesspeople—long baffled by the 
complex codetermination laws, sees some of its advantages.409 The popularity 
of codetermination among the German people rose to an all-time high by 
2016.410 
So what does all this mean? At minimum, the success of the German system 
serves as an empirical rejoinder to the hypothetical arguments used by law and 
economics scholars to justify the exclusive shareholder franchise. 
Codetermination was born of consensual agreement at a time when labor and 
capital had roughly equal bargaining power, and only later became enshrined in 
law. German firms have not been paralyzed by their more heterogeneous board 
electorates. And they have not been destroyed by voting cycles. The existing 
arguments against employee representation were already in trouble on their own 
theoretical terms; the presence of a significant, well-functioning counterexample 
should be decisive. 
To be sure, German codetermination has its faults.411 Its large, two-tiered 
board structures have been criticized.412 Employee representatives are elected 
through what appears to be an unnecessarily baroque version of an electoral 
college.413  And it may not directly translate to the United States for a variety of 
social or cultural reasons. But it is certainly functioning well enough that it 
cannot be dismissed, and it provides a proof of concept of the mutual-control 
model of corporate governance. 
                                                          
407 See Simon Jager, Benjamin Schoefer & Jörg Heining, Labor in the 
Boardroom, at 28-29, http://economics.mit.edu/files/17273 (unpublished 
manuscript) (emphasis supplied). 
408 See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 352, at 237; Otto Sandrock, The Impact of 
European Developments on German Codetermination and German Corporate Law, in 
GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT 
243, 320 (Jean J. du Plessis et al., eds., 3d ed. 2017). 
409 See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 352, at 168. 
410 See id. at 188. 
411 See id. at 196-233; Sandrock, supra note 360, at 137-45. 
412 See du Plessis et al., supra note 357, at 8-13. 
413 See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 352, at 205; Sandrock, supra note 360, at 138.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
We have reached a critical point in the development of the corporation. 
Investors, long assumed to be uncomplicated profit-maximizers, are looking for 
ways to express a wider range of values in allocating their funds. Employees are 
agitating for greater say at their workplaces—resisting mandatory arbitration 
clauses, objecting to corporate expressions of political and religious views, and 
questioning the distribution of the profits of their labor. In turn, state and federal 
politicians are beginning to respond to these issues both on their own terms and, 
more significantly, by thinking more broadly about the fundamental structure of 
corporate governance. 
At the same time, the intellectual foundations of the modern corporation 
continue to disintegrate. The law-and-economics justifications for some of the 
core features of the modern corporation—the shareholder primacy norm and the 
exclusive shareholder franchise—have been exposed. Those arguments, it turns 
out, are based on flawed assumptions about the nature of shareholder 
preferences, misapply basic social choice theory, and are often inconsistent with 
some of the fundamental precepts of standard economics that are purported to 
support them. Their proponents are now at the point where they are unwilling to 
defend these arguments and yet strangely reluctant to abandon them, choosing 
instead to continue to rely on them without comment. The way we have 
constructed the modern corporation is under a great deal of pressure, from within 
and without.  
As we are forced to move away from the existing corporate order, we need 
to acknowledge the shortcomings (and the strengths) of its intellectual 
framework and begin to develop new models of firm governance. In this Article, 
we have cataloged the arguments for the exclusive shareholder franchise and, 
one by one, found them lacking, usually on their own terms. We then presented 
a new model of corporate governance that builds on eighty years of research into 
the nature of the firm and finds further support in a new theory of democratic 
participation that ensures the proper aggregation of constituent preferences 
through accurate and manageable markers. In sum, this article sets out the 
intellectual framework that will allow investors, employees, and policymakers 
to navigate the collapse of the shareholder primacy norm and, at the same time, 
provides a positive argument for the inclusion of workers in the future of 
corporate governance.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441307 
